

File 1:ERIC 1966-2004/Apr 29  
      (c) format only 2004 The Dialog Corporation  
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      (c) 2004 Institution of Electrical Engineers  
 File 5:Biosis Previews(R) 1969-2004/May W1  
      (c) 2004 BIOSIS  
 File 6:NTIS 1964-2004/May W2  
      (c) 2004 NTIS, Intl Cpyrght All Rights Res  
 File 7:Social SciSearch(R) 1972-2004/May W1  
      (c) 2004 Inst for Sci Info  
 File 8:Ei Compendex(R) 1970-2004/May W1  
      (c) 2004 Elsevier Eng. Info. Inc.  
 File 9:Business & Industry(R) Jul/1994-2004/May 07  
      (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
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      (c) 2004 Amer. Psychological Assn.  
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      (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
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      (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 19:Chem.Industry Notes 1974-2004/ISS 200418  
      (c) 2004 Amer.Chem.Soc.  
 File 20:Dialog Global Reporter 1997-2004/May 10  
      (c) 2004 The Dialog Corp.  
 File 21:NCJRS 1972-2004/Mar  
      (c) format only 2004 The Dialog Corporation  
 File 22:Employee Benefits 1986-2004/May  
      (c) 2004 Int.Fdn.of Empl.Ben.Plans  
 File 26:Foundation Directory 2004/Apr  
      (c) 2004 Foundation Center  
 File 27:Foundation Grants Index 1990-2004/Apr  
      (c) 2004 Foundation Center  
 File 29:Meteor.& Geoastro.Abs. 1970-2002/Jul  
      (c) 2002 Amer.Meteorological Soc.  
 File 30:AsiaPacific 1985-2004/Mar 01  
      (c) 2004 Aristarchus Knowledge Indus.  
 File 31:World Surface Coatings Abs 1976-2004/Apr  
      (c) 2004 Paint Research Assn.  
 File 34:SciSearch(R) Cited Ref Sci 1990-2004/May W1  
      (c) 2004 Inst for Sci Info  
 File 35:Dissertation Abs Online 1861-2004/Apr  
      (c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning  
 File 38:America:History & Life 1963-2004/Q2  
      (c) 2004 ABC CLIO Inc.  
 File 39:Historical Abstracts 1973-2004  
      (c) 2004 ABC-CLIO  
 File 40:Enviroline(R) 1975-2004/Apr  
 File 42:Pharmaceuticl News Idx 1974-2004/May W1  
      (c)2004 ProQuest Info&Learning  
 File 47:Gale Group Magazine DB(TM) 1959-2004/May 10  
      (c) 2004 The Gale group  
 File 48:SPORTDiscus 1962-2004/Apr  
      (c) 2004 Sport Information Resource Centre  
 File 49:PAIS Int. 1976-2004/Mar  
      (c) 2004 Public Affairs Information Service

Search Performed by Sylvia Keys 10-May-04

File 50: CAB Abstracts 1972-2004/Apr  
          (c) 2004 CAB International  
 File 51: Food Sci. & Tech. Abs 1969-2004/May W2  
          (c) 2004 FSTA IFIS Publishing  
 File 53: FOODLINE(R): Food Science & Technology 1972-2004/May 10  
          (c) 2004 LFRA  
 File 54: FOODLINE(R): Market Data 1979-2004/May 10  
          (c) 2004 LFRA  
 File 58: GeoArchive 1974-2004/Nov  
          (c) 2004 Geosystems  
 File 62: SPIN(R) 1975-2004/Mar W3  
          (c) 2004 American Institute of Physics  
 File 63: Transport Res(TRIS) 1970-2004/Apr  
          (c) fmt only 2004 Dialog Corp.  
 File 65: Inside Conferences 1993-2004/May W2  
          (c) 2004 BLDSC all rts. reserv.  
 File 66: GPO Mon. Cat. 1978-2004/Jun  
          (c) format only 2004 The Dialog Corp  
 File 67: World Textiles 1968-2004/Apr  
          (c) 2004 Elsevier Science Ltd.  
 File 71: ELSEVIER BIOBASE 1994-2004/May W1  
          (c) 2004 Elsevier Science B.V.  
 File 73: EMBASE 1974-2004/May W1  
          (c) 2004 Elsevier Science B.V.  
 File 74: Int. Pharm. Abs 1970-2004/Apr B2  
          (c) 2004 Amer. Soc. of Health-Sys. Pharm.  
 File 75: TGG Management Contents(R) 86-2004/May W1  
          (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 79: Foods Adlibra(TM) 1974-2002/Apr  
          (c) 2002 General Mills  
 File 80: TGG Aerospace/Def. Mkts(R) 1986-2004/May 10  
          (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 81: MIRA - Motor Industry Research 2001-2004/Mar  
          (c) 2004 MIRA Ltd.  
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          (c) 2004 ORYX Press  
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          (c) 2000 IFI/CLAIMS(r)  
 File 87: TULSA (Petroleum Abs) 1965-2004/May W2  
          (c) 2004 The University of Tulsa  
 File 88: Gale Group Business A.R.T.S. 1976-2004/May 07  
          (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 89: GeoRef 1785-2004/May B1  
          (c) 2004 American Geological Institute  
 File 91: MANTIS(TM) 1880-2004/Dec  
          2001 (c) Action Potential  
 File 93: TableBase(R) Sep 1997-2004/Apr W4  
          (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 94: JICST-EPlus 1985-2004/Apr W3  
          (c) 2004 Japan Science and Tech Corp(JST)  
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          (c) 2004 FIZ TECHNIK  
 File 96: FLUIDEX 1972-2004/Apr  
          (c) 2004 Elsevier Science Ltd.  
 File 98: General Sci Abs/Full-Text 1984-2004/May  
          (c) 2004 The HW Wilson Co.  
 File 99: Wilson Appl. Sci & Tech Abs 1983-2004/Apr  
          (c) 2004 The HW Wilson Co.  
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| Set | Items | Description |
|-----|-------|-------------|
|-----|-------|-------------|

Search Performed by Sylvia Keys 10-May-04

S1 463677 AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR ENGLISH)-  
()AUCTION?  
S2 6869305 REWARD? OR INCENTIVE? OR AWARD? OR PREMIUM? OR GIFT? OR CA-  
RROT? OR PROMOTION?  
S3 118327 (QUALIF? OR APPROV? OR ELIGIB?)(5N)(BIDDER? OR PERSON OR P-  
ERSONS OR PLAYER OR PLAYERS OR CUSTOMER? OR CLIENT? OR TRADER  
OR TRADERS OR PARTICIPANT OR PARTICIPANTS) NOT WINNER?  
S4 1720 (BID OR BIDS OR BIDDING)(5N)(BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR?)  
S5 1945 PREDETERMIN?()(CRITERIA OR BEHAVIOR?)  
S6 6634 S1(5N)S2  
S7 1 S6(5N)S3  
S8 2 S6(5N)S4  
S9 2 S8 NOT S7  
S10 2 RD (unique items)  
S11 0 S6(5N)S5  
S12 34 S6(5N)(CRITERIA? OR BEHAVIOR? OR BEHAVIOUR?)  
S13 32 S12 NOT (S7 OR S10)  
S14 13 S13 NOT PY>1998  
S15 8 RD (unique items)  
S16 1852 S2(5N)S3  
S17 0 S16(5N)(S4 OR S5)  
S18 29 S16(5N)(CRITERIA? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR BEHAVIOR?)  
S19 29 S18 NOT (S7 OR S10 OR S15)  
S20 8 S19 NOT PY>1998  
S21 7 RD (unique items)  
S22 225 S1(5N)(S4 OR S5)  
S23 9 S22(8N)S2  
S24 8 S23 NOT (S7 OR S10 OR S15 OR S21)  
S25 5 S24 NOT PY>1998  
S26 3 RD (unique items)  
?

7/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 13)  
DIALOG(R)File 13:BAMP  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

1294756 Supplier Number: 03665565 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Pros & cons of using e-auctions with an established supply base. (Supplier Management).**

Supplier Selection & Management Report, p 1  
December 2002  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Newsletter; Interview & speech ISSN: 1046-3771 (United States)  
LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 1529

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

TEXT:

...the time, we stay with the incumbent supplier so we don't have transition costs, **qualification** costs, and **customer approvals** ."

Intel, meanwhile uses e- **auctions** to set the price without **awarding** the business. "We have to look at the total cost and quality first," Craig Brown...  
?

15/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 7)

DIALOG(R)File 7:Social SciSearch(R)  
(c) 2004 Inst for Sci Info. All rts. reserv.

03058189 GENUINE ARTICLE#: XE737 NO. REFERENCES: 30

**TITLE: Strategic trading in a two-sided foreign exchange auction**

AUTHOR(S): Goldberg L; Tenorio R

CORPORATE SOURCE: FED RESERVE BANK NEW YORK, RES DEPT, 33 LIBERTY ST/NEW  
YORK//NY/10045 (REPRINT); NBER, /CAMBRIDGE//MA/02138; UNIV NOTRE  
DAME, COLL BUSINESS ADM/NOTRE DAME//IN/46556

JOURNAL: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1997, V42, N3-4 (MAY), P  
299-326

PUBLISHER: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS

LANGUAGE: English DOCUMENT TYPE: Article

(ABSTRACT AVAILABLE)

...ABSTRACT: countries increasingly utilizing two-sided auctions, we show  
that the choice of the discrete 'tatonnement' **auction** creates  
**incentives** for strategic **behavior** among market participants.  
Theoretical predictions on strategic under-revelation of demand or  
supply positions are...

15/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 7)

DIALOG(R)File 7:Social SciSearch(R)  
(c) 2004 Inst for Sci Info. All rts. reserv.

02884876 GENUINE ARTICLE#: UF887 NO. REFERENCES: 21

**TITLE: TENDERS FOR EUROPEAN CEREAL EXPORT REFUNDS - A STRUCTURAL APPROACH**

AUTHOR(S): BOURGEON JM; LEROUX Y

CORPORATE SOURCE: INRA, ESR, PAM, 65 RUE ST BRIEUC/F-35042 RENNES//FRANCE/;  
INRA, ESR, PAM/F-35042 RENNES//FRANCE/; UNIV PARIS  
05, THEMA/NANTERRE//FRANCE/

JOURNAL: EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1996, V23, N1, P5-26

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH DOCUMENT TYPE: ARTICLE

(Abstract Available)

ABSTRACT: A large part of the EU's export refunds are **awarded** through  
tender procedures. We apply **auction** theory to model the traders'  
**behaviour** for weekly tenders of soft wheat intervention stocks.  
Specification and estimation of the optimal bidding...

15/3,K/3 (Item 3 from file: 7)

DIALOG(R)File 7:Social SciSearch(R)  
(c) 2004 Inst for Sci Info. All rts. reserv.

02365113 GENUINE ARTICLE#: HW872 NO. REFERENCES: 41

**TITLE: BIDDING RINGS**

AUTHOR(S): MCAFEE RP; MCMILLAN J

CORPORATE SOURCE: UNIV TEXAS, DEPT ECON/AUSTIN//TX/78712; UNIV CALIF SAN  
DIEGO, GRAD SCH INT RELAT & PACIFIC STUDIES/LA JOLLA//CA/92093

JOURNAL: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1992, V82, N3 (JUN), P579-599

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH DOCUMENT TYPE: ARTICLE

(Abstract Available)

...IDENTIFIERS--INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; **AUCTIONS;** **INCENTIVES;**  
**BEHAVIOR;** **TEAMS**

15/3,K/4 (Item 1 from file: 9)  
DIALOG(R)File 9:Business & Industry(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

1062295 Supplier Number: 01062295 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**FCC Gives Iridium Satellite Project A Boost**  
**(FCC clears way for low-orbit satellite communications systems)**  
Newsbytes News Network, p N/A  
October 17, 1994  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal (United States)  
LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 321

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

TEXT:

...it has only five licenses to award. Should all six applications meet the FCC's **criteria**, the agency says it will **award** the licenses by **auction**.

The decision settles a long-running spat among Motorola's Iridium project, which would launch...

15/3,K/5 (Item 1 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

03656869 Supplier Number: 45163376 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**PRIVATE SECTOR TO GAIN RADIO SPECTRUM**  
CommunicationsWeek, p35  
Nov 28, 1994  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newsletter; Trade  
Word Count: 137

... believes the services that will be provided over the spectrum bands will meet the legal **criteria** for spectrum **auctions**, and that it will **award** those licenses through competitive bidding.

15/3,K/6 (Item 2 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

03601898 Supplier Number: 45070707 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**FCC Gives Iridium Satellite Project A Boost 10/17/94**  
Newsbytes, pN/A  
Oct 17, 1994  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newswire; General Trade  
Word Count: 328

... it has only five licenses to award. Should all six applications meet the FCC's **criteria**, the agency says it will **award** the licenses by **auction**.

The decision settles a long-running spat among Motorola's Iridium project, which would launch...

15/3,K/7 (Item 1 from file: 47)  
DIALOG(R)File 47:Gale Group Magazine DB(TM)  
(c) 2004 The Gale group. All rts. reserv.

04023298 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 15687140  
**Equilibrium in auctions with entry.**  
Levin, Dan; Smith, James L.  
American Economic Review, v84, n3, p585(15)  
June, 1994  
ISSN: 0002-8282 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT: A model of entry **incentives** in **auctions** determines  
equilibrium **behavior** when the number of entrants is randomly determined.  
Increased coordination costs have harmful effects on...

15/3,K/8 (Item 1 from file: 88)  
DIALOG(R)File 88:Gale Group Business A.R.T.S.  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

04340051 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 19555892  
**FCC stuck between Congress and court. (Federal Communications Commission)**  
McConnell, Chris  
Broadcasting & Cable, v127, n27, p20(1)  
June 30, 1997  
ISSN: 1068-6827 LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 574 LINE COUNT: 00048

... was some way we could make this process move faster."  
Robol would prefer using comparative **criteria** rather than **auctions**  
to **award** licenses in smaller markets. Harry Cole, a Washington lawyer  
who represents some applicants, also would...  
?

10/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 35)  
DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online  
(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

01951392 ORDER NO: AADAA-I3092507

**Economic incentives for endangered species protection**

Author: Parkhurst, Gregory Malcolm

Degree: Ph.D.

Year: 2003

Corporate Source/Institution: University of Wyoming (0264)

Source: VOLUME 64/05-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 1776. 286 PAGES

...subjects coordinated their conservation activities to achieve the optimal habitat configuration. In the fourth essay **bidding behavior** in **incentive** compatible Vickrey-style **auctions** when people have both positive and negative induced values for the good is explored. In...

10/3,K/2 (Item 1 from file: 88)  
DIALOG(R)File 88:Gale Group Business A.R.T.S.  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

06720920 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 113757376

**Negative values in Vickrey auctions.**

Parkhurst, Gregory M.; Shogren, Jason F.; Dickinson, David L.

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86, 1, 222(14)

Feb, 2004

ISSN: 0002-9092

LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Fulltext; Abstract

WORD COUNT: 9121 LINE COUNT: 00874

TEXT:

...potatoes. The open question we address herein is whether the presence of negative values affects **bidding behavior** within the **incentive** compatible Vickrey-style **auctions** used in laboratory valuation experiments. Rather than having people bid on new products, we use...  
?



21/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 1)

DIALOG(R)File 1:ERIC

(c) format only 2004 The Dialog Corporation. All rts. reserv.

00140915 ERIC NO.: EJ071341 CLEARINGHOUSE NO.: AC502326

Upgrading the Disadvantaged

Barber, G. Russell, Jr.; And Others

Training and Development Journal, 27, 2, 14-6, Feb 73

1973 (19730000)

DESCRIPTORS: **Criteria** ; \*Disadvantaged; \*Employment **Qualifications** ;  
\*Identification; **Participant** Characteristics; \* **Promotion**  
(Occupational)

21/3,K/2 (Item 1 from file: 15)

DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)

(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

01955566 46496110

**Evolution of Medicaid coverage of Medicare cost sharing**

Carpenter, Letty

Health Care Financing Review v20n2 PP: 11-18 Winter 1998

ISSN: 0195-8631 JRNL CODE: HCF

WORD COUNT: 4011

...TEXT: two Medicaid benefit packages to this group: They could limit coverage to Medicare cost sharing ( **premiums** , deductibles, coinsurance) for **persons** meeting the new **eligibility criteria** who were not otherwise entitled to Medicaid, or they could, in addition to Medicare cost ...

21/3,K/3 (Item 2 from file: 15)

DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)

(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

01123767 97-73161

**Disaggregating gender from sex and sexual orientation: The effeminate man in the law and feminist jurisprudence**

Case, Mary Anne C

Yale Law Journal v105n1 PP: 1-105 Oct 1995

ISSN: 0044-0094 JRNL CODE: YLJ

WORD COUNT: 64563

...TEXT: fixed limits on the number of persons it would promote to partnership, nor any fixed **criteria** for **promotion** . Of the 88 **eligible persons** , 47 were admitted, 21 were rejected outright, and 20 were placed on hold. Id. at...

21/3,K/4 (Item 3 from file: 15)

DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)

(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

00451037 89-22824

**Computers Improve Information Flow**

Bowman, Robert; Steltzer, Theresa M.

Distribution v88n5 PP: 40-44 May 1989

ISSN: 0273-6721 JRNL CODE: DWW

...ABSTRACT: an incentive program that allows them to collect points toward prizes. There are 35 excellence **criteria** for **awarding** points. At 100 points, **participants** are **eligible** for discounts, and other **awards** are also on a point-level scale. The routing system software, Roadshow, is also offered...

**21/3,K/5 (Item 1 from file: 16)**  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

05338559 Supplier Number: 48122670 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Kick-Starting the NC Market**  
Greenemeier, Larry  
MIDRANGE Systems, p001  
Nov 14, 1997  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Magazine/Journal; Trade  
Word Count: 960

... Purchases must be ordered by March 2, 1998, and installed by March 31, 1998, for **customers** to be **eligible** to participate in the **promotion**. Those meeting the **criteria** for the free Series 300 can choose between either the 110 Ethernet or 210 Token...

**21/3,K/6 (Item 1 from file: 21)**  
DIALOG(R)File 21:NCJRS  
(c) format only 2004 The Dialog Corporation . All rts. reserv.

061860  
**TITLE: INSURANCE INTEREST IN CRIME PREVENTION (FROM CRANFIELD PAPERS, 1978, BY JOHN BROWN - SEE NCJ-61854)**  
**AUTHOR(S): WESSELS, E C**  
**CORPORATE SOURCE: Peel Press, London, England EC1N 8FE A7439**  
1978 6 p  
**COUNTRY OF PUBLICATION: United Kingdom**

**21/3,K/7 (Item 1 from file: 88)**  
DIALOG(R)File 88:Gale Group Business A.R.T.S.  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

01715796 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 03759246  
**Relationship between the retirement, disability, and unemployment insurance programs: the U.S. experience.**  
Reno, Virginia P.; Price, Daniel N.  
Social Security Bulletin, 48, n5, 24-37  
May, 1985  
ISSN: 0037-7910 LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext  
WORD COUNT: 8216 LINE COUNT: 00781

... be hired upon application for the work.  
With no change in the disability insurance benefit **eligibility criteria**, the number of **persons** applying for, and being **awarded**, benefits grew rapidly in the early 1970's. The number of applicants grew from about...  
?

26/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 7)  
DIALOG(R)File 7:Social SciSearch(R)  
(c) 2004 Inst for Sci Info. All rts. reserv.

00822788 GENUINE ARTICLE#: JE701 NO. REFERENCES: 9  
**TITLE: INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED- BID AUCTIONS**  
AUTHOR(S): COPPINGER VM; SMITH VL; TITUS JA  
CORPORATE SOURCE: ARIZONA STATE UNIV/TEMPE//AZ/85281; UNIV ARIZONA/TUCSON//AZ/85721  
JOURNAL: ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1980, V18, N1, P1-22  
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH DOCUMENT TYPE: ARTICLE  
  
**TITLE: INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED- BID AUCTIONS**

26/3,K/2 (Item 1 from file: 75)  
DIALOG(R)File 75:TGG Management Contents(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.  
  
00179135 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 16877283 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULL TEXT)  
**Two models of bid-taker cheating in Vickrey auctions. (includes appendices)**  
Rothkopf, Michael H.; Harstad, Ronald M.  
The Journal of Business, v68, n2, p257(11)  
April, 1995  
ISSN: 0021-9398 LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext; Abstract  
WORD COUNT: 5653 LINE COUNT: 00448

... taker starts the process by deciding whether to hold standard sealed-bid auctions or Vickrey **auctions**. The bidders' equilibrium **behavior** creates positive **incentives** for all **bid** takers, except the type most prone to cheat, to choose standard sealed-bid auctions, and...

26/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 88)  
DIALOG(R)File 88:Gale Group Business A.R.T.S.  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.  
  
04785082 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 20611172  
**Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand.**  
Alsemgeest, Paul; Noussair, Charles; Olson, Mark  
Economic Inquiry, v36, n1, p87(11)  
Jan, 1998  
ISSN: 0095-2583 LANGUAGE: English RECORD TYPE: Fulltext; Abstract  
WORD COUNT: 7817 LINE COUNT: 00620

... and Organization, September 1985, 275-300.  
Coppinger, Vicki, Vernon L. Smith, and Jon Titus. "Incentives **and** Behavior **in** English, Dutch, and Sealed Bid **Auctions** ." **Economic Inquiry**, January 1980, 1-22.  
Cox, James C., Vernon L. Smith, and James M. Walker...  
?

STN Search

=> d hist

(FILE 'HOME' ENTERED AT 15:29:04 ON 10 MAY 2004)

FILE 'CONFSCI' ENTERED AT 15:29:15 ON 10 MAY 2004

L1 1 S (AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR ENGLISH) ( )

STN Search

=> display 11

ENTER ANSWER NUMBER OR RANGE (1):1

ENTER DISPLAY FORMAT (BIB):bib

L1 ANSWER 1 OF 1 CONFSCI COPYRIGHT 2004 CSA on STN  
AN 77:13308 CONFSCI  
DN 77037810  
TI Fair game properties of **auction awards** in U.S.  
Treasury Bill market.  
AU Langsen, A.L.  
CS California State U, Hayward, Ca 94542.  
SO Abstracts in TIMS/ORSA Bulletin," Spring 77 (No. 3), \$3 per copy: TIMS,  
146 Westminster St., Providence, RI 02903 or ORSA, 428 E. Preston St.,  
Baltimore, MD 21202..  
Meeting Info.: TIMS/ORSA Joint National Meeting (A772075). San Francisco,  
California. 9-11 May 77. The Institute of Management Sciences; Operations  
Research Society of America.  
DT Conference Article  
FS DCCP  
LA UNAVAILABLE

File 256:SoftBase:Reviews,Companies&Prods. 82-2004/Apr  
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(c) 2004 Institution of Electrical Engineers  
File 35:Dissertation Abs Online 1861-2004/Apr  
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File 65:Inside Conferences 1993-2004/May W2  
(c) 2004 BLDSC all rts. reserv.  
File 99:Wilson Appl. Sci & Tech Abs 1983-2004/Apr  
(c) 2004 The HW Wilson Co.  
File 233:Internet & Personal Comp. Abs. 1981-2003/Sep  
(c) 2003 EBSCO Pub.  
File 583:Gale Group Globalbase(TM) 1986-2002/Dec 13  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group  
File 474:New York Times Abs 1969-2004/May 07  
(c) 2004 The New York Times  
File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs 1973-2004/May 07  
(c) 2004 The New York Times  
File 139:EconLit 1969-2004/Apr  
(c) 2004 American Economic Association

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| Set | Items | Description   |
|-----|-------|---|
| S1  | 427   | (AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR ENGLISH-<br>)())AUCTION?)(5N)(REWARD? OR INCENTIVE? OR AWARD? OR PREMIUM? -<br>OR GIFT? OR CARROT? OR PRIZE? OR POINTS OR BONUS? OR PROMOTIO-<br>N?) |
| S2  | 3030  | (QUALIF? OR APPROV? OR ELIGIB?)(5N)(BIDDER? OR PERSON OR P-<br>ERSONS OR PLAYER OR PLAYERS OR CUSTOMER? OR CLIENT? OR TRADER<br>OR TRADERS OR PARTICIPANT OR PARTICIPANTS) NOT WINNER?                  |
| S3  | 3585  | AU=(WALKER, J? OR WALKER J? OR VAN()LUCHENE, A? OR VAN()LU-<br>CHENE A? OR TEDESCO, D? OR TEDESCO D?)   |
| S4  | 0     | S1 AND S2   |
| S5  | 0     | S1 AND (NON()WINNER?)   |
| S6  | 119   | S1 AND (BIDDER? OR PERSON OR PERSONS OR PLAYER OR PLAYERS -<br>OR CUSTOMER? OR CLIENT? OR TRADER OR TRADERS OR PARTICIPANT OR<br>PARTICIPANTS) NOT WINNER?  |
| S7  | 42    | S6 NOT PY>1998  |
| S8  | 34    | RD (unique items)   |
| S9  | 298   | PREDETERMIN?(5N)(CRITERIA? OR BEHAVIOUR? OR BEHAVIOR? OR B-<br>ID OR BIDS OR BIDDING)   |
| S10 | 0     | S9 AND S1   |
| S11 | 0     | S9 AND AUCTION?   |
| S12 | 0     | S3 AND (S1 OR S2)   |
| ?   |       |   |

8/5/1 (Item 1 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R)File 2:INSPEC

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6164168 INSPEC Abstract Number: C1999-03-7120-035

**Title: Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation**

Author(s): Wurman, P.R.; Walsh, W.E.; Wellman, M.P.

Author Affiliation: Artificial Intelligence Lab., Michigan Univ., Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Journal: Decision Support Systems vol.24, no.1 p.17-27

Publisher: Elsevier,

Publication Date: Nov. 1998 Country of Publication: Netherlands

CODEN: DSSYDK ISSN: 0167-9236

SICI: 0167-9236(199811)24:1L:17:FDAE;1-1

Material Identity Number: F773-1999-002

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 0167-9236/98/\$19.00

Document Number: S0167-9236(98)00060-8

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Practical (P)

Abstract: We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic **incentives** facing **participants** in such **auctions**, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids. We also perform a computational analysis of the auctioneer's task, exhibiting efficient algorithms for processing bids and calculating allocations. (23 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: economics; electronic commerce; Internet

Identifiers: flexible double auctions; electronic commerce; multiple buyers; multiple sellers; market-clearing prices; economic incentives; single-unit bids; multi-unit bids; computational analysis; Internet

Class Codes: C7120 (Financial computing); C7210N (Information networks)

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8/5/2 (Item 2 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R)File 2:INSPEC

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5910658 INSPEC Abstract Number: C9806-1290D-062

**Title: Multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions with variable awards**

Author(s): Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R.; Kahn, C.M.

Author Affiliation: Dept. of Bus. Admin., Illinois Univ., Champaign, IL, USA

Journal: Games and Economic Behavior vol.23, no.1 p.25-42

Publisher: Academic Press,

Publication Date: April 1998 Country of Publication: USA

CODEN: GEBEEF ISSN: 0899-8256

SICI: 0899-8256(199804)23:1L:25:MUYA;1-W

Material Identity Number: N737-98004

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 0899-8256/98/\$25.00

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

Abstract: Multi-unit auctions in which **bidders** can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi-unit auctions in which **bidders** can only win one unit. In an independent-private-values, pay-your-bid auction where **bidders** may win up to two units, we show that first-order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur

with positive probability. This behavior is not found in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. It also contrasts with asymmetric first-price auctions of a single good, whose first-order conditions are superficially similar. A uniform-distribution example is analyzed numerically. (15 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: economics; probability

Identifiers: multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions; variable awards; **bidders**; independent-private-values pay-your-bid auction; first-order conditions; multi-unit uniform-price auctions; asymmetric first-price auctions

Class Codes: C1290D (Systems theory applications in economics and business); C1140Z (Other topics in statistics)

Copyright 1998, IEE

8/5/3 (Item 3 from file: 2)

DIALOG(R) File 2:INSPEC

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5671616 INSPEC Abstract Number: C9710-1230-028

**Title: Limitations of the Vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems**

Author(s): Sandholm, T.

Author Affiliation: Dept. of Comput. Sci., Washington Univ., St. Louis, MO, USA

Conference Title: ICMAS-96 Proceedings. Second International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems p.299-306

Publisher: AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA, USA

Publication Date: 1996 Country of Publication: USA xvi+470 pp.

Material Identity Number: XX97-00120

Conference Title: Proceedings of ICMAS '96: 2nd International Conference on Multiagent Systems

Conference Date: 10-13 Dec. 1996 Conference Location: Kyoto, Japan

Language: English Document Type: Conference Paper (PA)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

Abstract: Auctions provide an efficient distributed mechanism for solving problems such as task and resource allocation in multiagent systems. In the Vickrey auction, which has been widely advocated for automated auctions, the best bid wins the auction, but at the second best price. In certain settings this promotes truthful bidding and avoids counterspeculation. This paper analyses the circumstances when this protocol is appropriate, and explicates the desirable properties and lack thereof in varied settings. The first part of the paper discusses known deficiencies of the Vickrey **auction** : **bidder** collusion, a lying **auctioneer** , **promotion** of lying in non-private-value auctions, lower revenue than alternative protocols, and the necessity to reveal sensitive information. The second part of the paper presents our results regarding new limitations of the protocol, which arise especially among computational agents. These include inefficient allocation and lying in sequential auctions of interrelated items, untruthful bidding when a risk averse agent has local uncertainty, and the need for counterspeculation to make deliberation control (or information gathering) decisions when an agent has local uncertainty. (24 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: cooperative systems; problem solving; resource allocation; software agents; uncertainty handling

Identifiers: Vickrey auction; computational multiagent systems; problem solving; task allocation; resource allocation; price; bidding; protocol; sensitive information; risk averse agent; uncertainty; information gathering; decision making

Class Codes: C1230 (Artificial intelligence); C6170 (Expert systems)

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8/5/4 (Item 4 from file: 2)  
DIALOG(R) File 2:INSPEC  
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03860040 INSPEC Abstract Number: C91026723

**Title: The fair and efficient division of the Winsor family silver**

Author(s): Pratt, J.W.; Zechhauser, R.J.

Author Affiliation: Harvard Bus. Sch., Harvard Univ., Boston, MA, USA

Journal: Management Science vol.36, no.11 p.1293-301

Publication Date: Nov. 1990 Country of Publication: USA

CODEN: MSCIAM ISSN: 0025-1909

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 0025-1909/90/3611/1293\$01.25

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

**Abstract:** This is the true story of the actual use of a formal decentralized division procedure to allocate silver heirlooms among eight grandchildren fairly and efficiently without distasteful direct monetary payments. Each grandchild's stated preferences for objects in contention were roughly represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allocations were made as they would be in a market for probability shares in the objects, assuming each grandchild had a fixed amount of an artificial currency and made optimal purchases. The market-clearing equilibrium prices were chosen as in a second-price **auction** to **reward** honest reporting. Although the procedure was decentralized and most **participants** did not fully understand it or the preference information desired, it handled all major considerations well and was regarded as equitable. (11 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: behavioural sciences; management science

Identifiers: resource allocation; incentive compatibility; probability shares; preference revelation; management science; Winsor family silver; von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function

Class Codes: C1290 (Applications of systems theory); C1290P (Social science and politics)

8/5/5 (Item 5 from file: 2)  
DIALOG(R) File 2:INSPEC  
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02729633 INSPEC Abstract Number: C86046384

**Title: Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: an axiomatic approach**

Author(s): Guth, W.

Author Affiliation: Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Koln Univ., West Germany

Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences vol.11, no.3 p.283-94

Publication Date: June 1986 Country of Publication: Netherlands

CODEN: MSOSDD ISSN: 0165-4896

U.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code: 0165-4896/86/\$3.50

Language: English Document Type: Journal Paper (JP)

Treatment: Theoretical (T)

**Abstract:** Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games are considered as special classes of games with incomplete information. The special feature of these games is that choosing a strategy in such a game amounts to displaying ones (not necessarily true) preferences. The papers main axiom is the axiom of displayed freedom from envy by which no **player** according to his displayed preferences should prefer to have what another **player** has to what he has himself. This axiom and the well-known property

of **incentive** compatibility imply the rules of **auctions** and public tenders originally discussed by Vickrey (1961). The axiomatic characterization is considered as a strong support for the Vickrey rules. There is no obvious reason why the rules actually applied (e.g. the rules of public tenders in the Federal Republic of Germany) often violate these rules. For fair division problems the two axioms are shown to be mutually inconsistent. By weakening the requirement of incentive compatibility, however rules can be determined for fair division problems which are a reasonable analogue of the Vickrey-rules. Finally, it is discussed how these ideas can be extended to other allocation problems. (16 Refs)

Subfile: C

Descriptors: commerce; game theory

Identifiers: auctions; public tenders; fair division games; incomplete information; displayed freedom from envy; displayed preferences; axiomatic characterization

Class Codes: C1140E (Game theory); C1290D (Economics and business)

8/5/6 (Item 1 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online

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01564627 ORDER NO: AAD97-22548

**ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF INFORMATION QUALITY IN COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS AND SIGNALING GAMES**

Author: GAIER, ERIC MICHAEL

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1997

Corporate Source/Institution: DUKE UNIVERSITY (0066)

Supervisor: ROBERT C. MARSHALL

Source: VOLUME 58/02-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 542. 114 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, THEORY

Descriptor Codes: 0511

This thesis analyzes the role of information quality in common value auctions and signaling games. Chapter 2 develops a common value auction model in which the **bidders** choose the quality of their information service. For two distinct auction mechanisms, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategies are derived when information quality is exogenously determined. Expected seller revenue from the royalty rate auction is shown to exceed the revenue from the **bonus bid auction**. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is then derived for the case in which information quality is endogenously determined. The bonus bid mechanism is shown to induce higher quality information than the royalty rate mechanism. The conditions under which the exogenous revenue ranking can be extended to the case of endogenous information quality are discussed.

Chapter 3 develops a common value auction model with heterogeneous objects. Distinct groups of **bidders** compete for each object. Information quality may differ across the groups. Two forces are isolated with regard to the seller's preference for the sequence of objects sold. First, when the groups of **bidders** are equally well informed, the seller always prefers to sell the objects in ascending order of value. Second, when the objects are equally valuable, the seller always prefers to have more informed **bidders** precede less informed **bidders**. When the forces work in conjunction with one another, the seller has an unambiguous preference for an ascending order of object value. For cases in which the forces work in opposition to one another, conditions under which one force dominates the other are derived.

Chapter 4 presents a model which extends the strategic information

transmission literature to consider the question of endogenous information quality. A game is formulated in which the agent strategically chooses the probability with which he is able to distinguish one state from its complement. This stage of the game is termed test design. It is shown that oversight of the test design phase always improves the welfare of the principal, while oversight of the test reporting stage may not. The results are discussed in the context of testing institutions in the Department of Defense.

8/5/7 (Item 2 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online

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01508194 ORDER NO: AAD96-32759

**ACQUIRING INFORMATION: THREE ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION  
(AUCTIONS, BLACKWELL'S SUFFICIENCY)**

Author: PERSICO, NICOLA GIUSEPPE

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1996

Corporate Source/Institution: NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY (0163)

Source: VOLUME 57/06-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 2611. 108 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, THEORY

Descriptor Codes: 0511

Information economics is an important area of economic research, and one that has provided the profession with important insights about economic activities. The theory has generally taken as given the information of economic agents, and modeled their behaviour on this basis. Taking the view that information is instead acquired by the agents, this dissertation develops a theory which makes it possible to ask (and answer) questions like "what is useful information?" and "when will agents acquire a lot of information?".

Chapter 2 is titled "Information Acquisition in Affiliated Decision Problems". This is the theoretical foundation of our project, and investigates information acquisition in decision problems. We introduce a new notion of "better information", Accuracy-order (A-order), defined on continuous families of signals. Accuracy formalizes the idea that "a signal that is more correlated with the unknown random variable is better". This concept is indigenous to an economically interesting subset of all decision problems, those where signals are affiliated and the payoff function satisfies the single-crossing property. On this subset, this notion is found to be "tight", in the sense that A-order is an if-and-only-if condition for better information. On the subset, it is shown that Blackwell's Sufficiency is a special case of Accuracy. Finally, a comparative statics result is obtained, about which decision problem will induce more information acquisition.

Using the results obtained in Chapter 2, we remove a key assumption of auction theory, whereby the information bidders have about each other and about the object being sold is given. In Chapter 3, "Information Acquisition in Auctions", we present a general framework in which to examine the acquisition of information by bidders. We show that: (i) different auction forms give different incentives to acquire information. Specifically, a first-price auction gives higher incentives than a second-price auction to acquire information that is highly correlated with the opponent's bid. (ii) the different incentives to acquire information can overturn the well-known Milgrom and Weber result stating that a second-price auction dominates a first-price in terms of revenue to the seller.

Chapter 4 investigates a technical question of auction theory: given a

first-price auction with asymmetric primitives (due, for example, to different information accuracy), when will the equilibrium be unique? We show that it will be unique in a large class of environments, and discuss the modeling features that generate this result.

8/5/8 (Item 3 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online  
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01468290 ORDER NO: AADAA-I9607199

**ESSAYS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (AGENCY THEORY, INCENTIVE SCHEME)**

Author: GUPTA, SRABANA

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1994

Corporate Source/Institution: UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA (0070)

Chair: DAVID SAPPINGTON

Source: VOLUME 56/11-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 4509. 93 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, THEORY

Descriptor Codes: 0511

This dissertation consists of empirical and theoretical essays that examine a variety of incentive problems.

The first essay is an empirical one that examines **incentives** for collusion in an **auction** market. It investigates whether bid prices for highway construction are related to conditions that favor the formation of a cartel. The probability of a successful cartel is hypothesized to be higher when there is more repeat bidding (due to lower cost of negotiation), resulting in a higher average price. The empirical results support the prediction. Also, as the number of firms increases, the cost of negotiation increases making cartels less profitable. Consistent with this reasoning, it is found that winning bids fall as the number of **bidders** rises until there are about 6 to 8 firms. Since subsequent entry has no effect on the winning bid price, it is concluded that the highway construction market becomes competitive once there are about eight **bidders**.

The other two essays examine a "double moral hazard problem". Double moral hazard exists when the outcome of a production process is influenced by the unobservable actions of both the employer (principal), and the employee (agent). That the jointly efficient outcome is unattainable due to double moral hazard is well known. The main contribution is to show that employment of multiple agents permits contracts that completely or partially resolve the double moral hazard problem. This incentive to employ multiple agents is shown to be independent of the well-known incentive to use multiple agents' outputs to monitor one another when the random components of the outputs are correlated. The use of multiple agents can resolve all incentive problems when there is a moving support on output (essay 2). Introducing another agent whose output also depends on the principal's choice distinguishes shirking by the principal from that of an agent. In the case of a nonmoving support on output (essay 3), although the jointly efficient outcome is not attainable, use of multiple agents does improve the nature of the optimal contract.

8/5/9 (Item 4 from file: 35)

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01093354 ORDER NO: AAD90-06568

**A STUDY OF MULTIPLICATIVE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN SECOND-PRICE**

#### **MULTICOMPONENT AUCTIONS**

Author: WOOD, DAVID JOSEPH  
Degree: PH.D.  
Year: 1989  
Corporate Source/Institution: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY (0028)  
CHAIR: SHMUEL OREN  
Source: VOLUME 50/10-B OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.  
PAGE 4749. 325 PAGES  
Descriptors: OPERATIONS RESEARCH; BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, MANAGEMENT;  
ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL  
Descriptor Codes: 0796; 0454; 0546

This thesis examines the Nash equilibria arising in a model of common-value second-price auctions. We assume that each **bidder** forms an unbiased estimate of the unknown true value of the auction, and submits a bid that is the product of that estimate and some pre-selected multiplier. Among our findings, we note that: (1) Assumptions about the probabilistic nature of the estimating error can be critical in the modeling process; differences in the shape of probability densities which are barely noticeable can produce significant changes in the Nash equilibria. (2) In a two- **bidder** auction, Nash equilibria in multiplicative strategies exist only if a particular kind of symmetry exists between the **bidders** ; if this symmetry is present, the resulting equilibria are not unique.

We also examine a particular class of auctions (exemplified by a US Forest Service timber auction), in which there are multiple items of unknown quantity for sale, and in which bids are submitted as a vector of unit-prices. The inner product of this vector and a previously-published vector of bidtaker quantity estimates must equal the price agreed upon in the second-price auction. Since the bidtaker quantity estimates may be in error (even if statistically unbiased), the amount actually paid may turn out to be significantly different from the price anticipated at the time the **auction** was **awarded** .

This set of **auction** rules allows the **bidder** to attempt to gain extra profit by "skewing" his bid, i.e., offering a vector of unit-price bids that takes advantage of perceived inaccuracies in the bidtaker's quantity estimates. Optimal skewed bidding strategies for a risk-neutral **bidder** were worked out by Stark (1974), and successful application of them can produce significantly higher average profits for a **bidder** . We investigate the probabilistic nature of this improvement in profit due to Stark's optimal skewing strategies, and show how application of them affects the Nash equilibria of the multiplicative-strategy second-price auction.

Finally, we propose an additional component of strategy which seeks to exploit skewed bidding to improve average profits even beyond Stark's strategies. That component is shown to have no significant effect in second-price auctions, but is likely to be quite effective in first-price auctions.

8/5/10 (Item 5 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online  
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951020 ORDER NO: NOT AVAILABLE FROM UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INT'L.

#### **EVIDENCE ON BIDDING STRATEGIES AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN TREASURY BILL AUCTIONS**

Author: CAMMACK, ELIZABETH BURD  
Degree: PH.D.  
Year: 1987  
Corporate Source/Institution: THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (0330)

Source: VOLUME 48/01-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.  
PAGE 188.  
Descriptors: ECONOMICS, FINANCE  
Descriptor Codes: 0508

The information content of market prices is an important issue in financial economics. Recent research focuses on effects of imperfect information on prices. Advances in auction theory, where the assumption of imperfect information is used, show how prices of a given asset may differ according to the type of market used to trade the asset. This paper tests whether the type of market mechanism used to buy Treasury bills matters. It compares the three month Treasury bill auction prices to secondary market prices of the identical bill for the 1973-1984 period. It is found that, on average, the mean **auction** price is four basis **points** below the comparable secondary market price. This result is consistent with the auction theory prediction that bids are downward biased estimates of the "true value" of the asset, when the number of **bidders** is finite. In addition, the average range of accepted **auction** bids is ten basis **points**. The difference between the mean and low auction prices is used as a measure of diversity of opinion. The downward biasing of the auction price relative to comparable secondary market prices is positively related to a transformation of this diversity of opinion measure. This result is consistent with the auction theory prediction that downward biasing of bids increases when **bidders**' private information is more diverse.

Other imperfect information models suggest prices may not reveal all private information. This paper tests whether the secondary and auction markets aggregate **traders**' private information differently, implying that secondary market prices are not fully revealing. If secondary market prices are fully revealing, the auction does not contain news beyond what is already reflected in secondary market prices observed when the auction bids are submitted. The results indicate that secondary market prices observed after the release of the auction outcome drop when the dispersion of opinion in the auction is greater than anticipated. Secondary market prices increase when the number of competitive **bidders** in the auction is greater than anticipated. The empirical finding that the secondary market reacts to the auction results implies that secondary and auction markets aggregate **traders**' private information differently.

8/5/11 (Item 6 from file: 35)  
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852971 ORDER NO: AAD84-20180

**THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE AUCTION RULES**

Author: HANSEN, ROBERT GORDON  
Degree: PH.D.  
Year: 1984  
Corporate Source/Institution: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES ( 0031)  
Source: VOLUME 45/06-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.  
PAGE 1816. 251 PAGES  
Descriptors: ECONOMICS, GENERAL  
Descriptor Codes: 0501

Auctions have been around for a long time, but only recently have they begun to be analyzed by economists. This dissertation addresses two aspects of auctions; first, how do the various auction methods (oral, sealed-bid, Dutch) compare when **bidders** are characterized by asymmetric information;

and second, how does the available empirical evidence compare to the predictions of the various theories?

With respect to the first question, this thesis derives theory implying that second-price auctions (oral) tend to yield lower expected prices for the seller and a higher value of information for informed **bidders** than do first-price **auctions** (sealed-bids). Also, second- **prize auctions** will generate more information production than first-price auctions.

Two methods are employed to test auction theories. The first is statistical estimation of regression equations using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. A variety of specifications and estimation methods point to the same conclusion: revenues from oral and sealed-bid auctions are not significantly different. The second method is to trace the evolution of auction methods for tobacco in the U.S. It is shown that this evolution can be explained by the earlier result on information production under different auction rules.

8/5/12 (Item 7 from file: 35)

DIALOG(R)File 35:Dissertation Abs Online

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743266 ORDER NO: AAD81-08590

**AUCTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES FOR PUBLIC ALLOCATION WITH APPLICATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLLUTION RIGHTS**

Author: LYON, RANDOLPH MATTHEW

Degree: PH.D.

Year: 1980

Corporate Source/Institution: UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN (0090)

Source: VOLUME 41/11-A OF DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL.

PAGE 4775. 205 PAGES

Descriptors: ECONOMICS, GENERAL

Descriptor Codes: 0501

Auctions and related procedures are examined with emphasis upon both their theoretical properties and their public-sector applications. The problem of allocating pollution rights is investigated in particular.

Following a brief introduction, basic issues surrounding procedures for public allocation are discussed in Chapter 2. One characteristic of public allocation problems is the frequent importance of an equity objective. Efficiency is also typically a primary goal. This study emphasizes a third property of certain procedures, incentive compatibility. This property implies that the allocation procedure encourages truthful revelation of information by **participants**. Incentive compatibility may be important for an allocation procedure if the procedure requires information from **participants** in order to yield outcomes which are efficient and/or equitable. In addition, incentive compatibility is closely related to objectives of ease of administration and certainty of outcome.

As well as being complementary, however, the above objectives are also conflicting. A major goal of this study, therefore, is to examine alternative auctions and regulatory approaches with respect to their trade-offs among these objectives in both theory and practice.

To investigate auctions for items such as pollution rights, a theoretical model of auctions for multiple homogeneous objects is suggested in Chapter 3, and equilibrium outcomes attainable by these auctions are characterized. Under simplifying assumptions the analysis indicates a type of equivalence in terms of **participants**' expected profits for all auctions for homogeneous goods having efficient equilibria. This work

extends recent results in the theory of single object auctions to the multiple item case and thereby provides the beginnings of a theory of outcomes of multiple object auctions.

Fair division procedures for indivisible goods are considered in Chapter 4. These procedures have received theoretical interest because investigators have believed that they might be useful in efficiently and equitably allocating goods among **participants** who each deserve a share of the goods. This study relaxes assumptions of previous investigators that **participants** either would behave truthfully or would know their opponents' characteristics with certainty. Instead, **players** are assumed to maximize expected profits given imperfect information about their competitors' characteristics, as in an auction.

Equilibrium bidding strategies are first derived for a particular procedure suggested by Knaster. Next it is proved that under assumptions of imperfect information and risk-neutral symmetric **bidders**, all efficient fair division procedures yield the **bidders** equivalent equilibrium expected profits.

The theoretical analyses of allocation procedures and their application to pollution rights distribution are then joined in Chapter 5. Alternative auctions and regulatory approaches are contrasted in terms of the dischargers' and government's expected profits using a simple theoretical model. Equity issues surrounding both Knaster's fair division procedure and an **incentive**-compatible **auction** are also suggested.

Applications of alternative auctions and regulatory approaches are simulated and contrasted in Chapter 6. Two cases studies are considered: a phosphorus removal program affecting 53 municipal treatment plants in Wisconsin and a biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) control program for 11 municipal and industrial dischargers along the Willamette River in Oregon. The alternative procedures considered are uniform treatment regulations, single-price and **incentive**-compatible **auctions**, and fair division.

The study as a whole aims to develop foundations which will be useful in both theoretical and applied research. Issues considered by the study may also be relevant to policy making in a range of areas where approaches utilizing economic incentives are possible alternatives to direct government regulation.

8/5/13 (Item 1 from file: 583)

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06688862

Forestry ministry to offer public 149 concessions

INDONESIA: 149 FOREST CONCESSIONS TO PUBLIC

Jakarta Post (XAK) 15 Sep 1998 p.8

Language: ENGLISH

According to the Forestry and Plantations Minister of Indonesia Muslimin Nasution on 14 September 1998, Indonesian government has allocated 149 forest concessions for the general public in 1998. These concessions will be **awarded** through an **auction** scheme. In addition, the scheme will include a scoring criteria which takes into account ecological, social and financial positions of the **participants** in the auction.

PRODUCT: Forestry (0800); Resources, Environment & Energy (9106);

EVENT: National Government Economics (94);

COUNTRY: Indonesia (9INO);



8/5/14 (Item 2 from file: 583)

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06379932

Department stores' anniversary celebrations spark flames in Taichung\

TAIWAN: DEPT. STORES TO CELEBRATE ANNIVERSARY

Commercial Times (XKC) 15 Oct 1996 p.31

Language: CHINESE

In its anniversary celebration, Shin Kong Mitsukoshi in Taiwan offers shopping cars, car park services, free goods delivery for purchases over NT\$2,000 and also temporary VIP discount cards for related enterprises' staff members. Da Ye Gao Dao Wu (translated name) and Li Ba (translated name), however, combine 1025 and their anniversary celebration activities to boost the change-season sales. Li Ba (translated name) launches **auctions**, discount coupons and free **gifts** to attract **customers**. Tonlin and Far Eastern individually integrate their nationwide branch stores to celebrate their anniversary. Tonlin gives out cars, Rolex watches and other luxury items in its 3-round free gift function while Far Eastern greatly cuts its household electrical appliances' prices and offers high-value imported merchandise as free gifts. Sogo Taipei plans to increase its free gift items from 70,000 in 1995 to 100,000 in 1996 for its company's card members. It also reduces the number of temporary counters during the anniversary celebration period in order to save space for **customers** to buy the formal merchandise items sold in the store. \*

COMPANY: SOGO TAIPEI; FAR EASTERN; ROLEX; TONLIN; FAR EASTERN; TONLIN; LI BA; LI BA; DA YE GAO DAO WU; SHIN KONG MITSUKOSHI

PRODUCT: Department Stores (5311);

EVENT: Public Affairs (29);

COUNTRY: Taiwan (9TAI);

8/5/15 (Item 3 from file: 583)

DIALOG(R) File 583:Gale Group Globalbase(TM)

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06196369

Property auctions draw poor response reflecting present market senti\

SINGAPORE: PROPERTY MARKET REMAINS WEAK

The Straits Times (XBB) 2 Sep. 1995 P.48

Language: ENGLISH

The property market in Singapore continues to remain weak and sluggish as buyers adopt a wait-and-see attitude. This is evident judging from the response from **bidders** from the recent property auctions held last week. The Jones Lang Wootton (JLW) auction on 30 August 1995 attracted 250 attendees with only one of the nine residential properties and shophouses **auctioned** **awarded**. The sole property sold is a 5,600 sq ft, freehold, single-storey detached house at Jalan Berjaya. It was closed for S\$ 3.02 mn (S\$ 539 per sq ft). The rest were withdrawn either because the bids were too low or **bidders** were not attracted to it. The Knight Frank Cheong Hock Chye & Baillieu auction on 31 August 1995 not only received a poor turnout with slightly more than 70 people but also saw only one of the nine properties auctioned taken up. The pair of adjoining double-storey pre-war conservation shophouses sitting on a 2,165 sq ft plot of land was sold for S\$ 2.01 mn (S\$ 928 per sq ft). The other 8 were withdrawn either because the bids were below the reserve price or there were no takers.

COMPANY: KNIGHT FRANK CHEONG HOCK CHYE & BAILLIEU; JLW; JONES LANG WOOTTON

PRODUCT: Residential Buildings (1520); Commercial Buildings Construction (1542CB);  
EVENT: Market & Industry News (60);  
COUNTRY: Singapore (9SIN);

**8/5/16 (Item 4 from file: 583)**

DIALOG(R)File 583:Gale Group Globalbase(TM)  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

06153959

Classic FM fights to end 'sealed bid' franchise auctions

UK: CLASSIC FM REQUESTS LICENSING CHANGES

Guardian (GN) 19 May 1995 p.5

Language: ENGLISH

Faced with the prospect that, despite its popularity, it could be eradicated by a higher **bidder**, Classic FM has urged the UK government to end the 'sealed bid' **auction** method of **awarding** radio licences and allow annual renegotiation of contracts. Although Classic's current eight year licence runs until 1998/99 the company is aware that the government will be reviewing broadcasting legislation in 1996.

COMPANY: CLASSIC FM

PRODUCT: Radio Broadcasting (4832);  
EVENT: Government Regulations (93); Licences & Sales Agreements (38);  
COUNTRY: United Kingdom (4UK);

**8/5/17 (Item 5 from file: 583)**

DIALOG(R)File 583:Gale Group Globalbase(TM)  
(c) 2002 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

03910103

TELECOM NEW ZEALAND THWARTS GOVT EFFORTS

NEW ZEALAND - TELECOM NEW ZEALAND THWARTS GOVT EFFORTS

Fintech Mobile Communications (FMC) 6 December 1990 p8-9

Telecom New Zealand, a communications operator, is taking legal action against a ruling by the Commerce Commission preventing its acquisition of more radio spectrum. Telecom Cellular New Zealand (TCNZ) is currently New Zealand's only cellular operator, and the New Zealand govt wants to break its dominance. TCNZ's cellular service runs on the Amps B network, and in May 1990, the company successfully bid for frequencies on the Tacs B and Amps A bands which the govt put up for auction to increase competition as well as to raise money. BellSouth, a US Bell company, was **awarded** the other frequency to be **auctioned**, Tacs A. However, in August 1990, the Commerce Commission provisionally decided that that since TCNZ would be able to dominate the market if it were awarded the two frequencies, it should not be awarded them. The Commerce Commission has until 30 November 1990 to reach a decision on the award of Tacs B to TCNZ, but has already confirmed that TCNZ should not be awarded Amps A. If TCNZ's appeal against the Amps A ruling is rejected by the New Zealand High Court, the New Zealand govt will be able to award the frequencies to the next highest **bidder**. Meanwhile, two new cellular mobile licences will shortly be granted in Australia. Article discusses the TCNZ situation in some detail.

PRODUCT: Cellular Radio Equipment (3662CE); Mobile Communications Equipment (3662MB); Cellular Radio Services (4811CR); Mobile Communications

Svcs (4811MC);  
EVENT: COMPANIES ACTIVITIES (10);  
COUNTRY: Australia (9AUS); New Zealand (9NEZ); OECD Pacific (915);

**8/5/18 (Item 1 from file: 474)**  
DIALOG(R)File 474:New York Times Abs  
(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

06030983 NYT Sequence Number: 417203911109

**NOTE SALE ACTIVITIES QUESTIONED**

GILPIN, KENNETH N  
New York Times, Col. 6, Pg. 39, Sec. 1  
Saturday November 9 1991  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: NYT LANGUAGE: English  
RECORD TYPE: Abstract

**ABSTRACT:**

Repr Edward Markey asks 39 primary dealers for explanation of disappointing results at **auction** of three-year Treasury notes; **points** to low volume of bids, which pushed up Government's borrowing costs, and reports of some type of protest against new auction rules; communication between dealers has diminished markedly since Salomon Brothers' bidding violations, which **traders** say harms efficiency of pricing mechanisms (S)

COMPANY NAMES: SALOMON BROTHERS INC  
DESCRIPTORS: FINANCES; GOVERNMENT BONDS; REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF INDUSTRY; CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS; RATES; DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION; LAW AND LEGISLATION  
PERSONAL NAMES: MARKEY, EDWARD J (REPR) ON; GILPIN, KENNETH N  
GEOGRAPHIC NAMES: UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES

**8/5/19 (Item 2 from file: 474)**  
DIALOG(R)File 474:New York Times Abs  
(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

04268049 NYT Sequence Number: 000000840818

**John Coleman, owner of Ritz-Carlton Hotel, gives Lenox Hill Neighborhood Assn auction celebration for its 10th anniversary; gift is private dinner for up to 120 guests at Jockey Club restaurant in hotel; \$150-a-person benefit, held at Sotheby's raises more than \$250,000 for association (S)**

NEMY, ENID  
New York Times, Col. 1, Pg. 6, Sec. 2  
Friday January 20 1984  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: NYT LANGUAGE: English  
RECORD TYPE: Abstract

COMPANY NAMES: LENOX HILL NEIGHBORHOOD ASSN; RITZ-CARLTON; JOCKEY CLUB; SOTHEBY PARKE BERNET INC  
PERSONAL NAMES: COLEMAN, JOHN; NEMY, ENID

**8/5/20 (Item 3 from file: 474)**  
DIALOG(R)File 474:New York Times Abs  
(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

01239813 NYT Sequence Number: 058249830113

**Rita Reif explains factors influencing prices for which antiques are sold**

at auction . Points out that besides quality of item, other influences in such sales include object's rarity, popularity of certain collectible categories, presence of at least two determined bidders and romance surrounding object's history. Photos of antiques which sold for record prices in '82 (M).)

REIF, RITA

New York Times, Col. 3, Pg. 8, Sec. 3

Thursday January 13 1983

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: NYT LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Abstract

SPECIAL FEATURES: Photo

DESCRIPTORS: ANTIQUES; ART; COLLECTORS AND COLLECTIONS; PRICES; AUCTIONS;  
RECORDS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

PERSONAL NAMES: REIF, RITA

**8/5/21 (Item 1 from file: 475)**

DIALOG(R)File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs

(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

07985090 NYT Sequence Number: 000000980618

**FCC SAYS MANY WIRELESS BIDDERS , SHORT OF CASH, TO RETURN LICENSES**

RITTER, SCOTT

Wall Street Journal, Col. 4, Pg. 12, Sec. B

Thursday June 18 1998

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: WSJ LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Abstract

ABSTRACT:

FCC says a large part of the wireless-communications licenses awarded in a \$10 billion government auction in 1996 will remain unused at least until next year; cash-strapped bidders have returned hundreds of the permits to the FCC (M)

COMPANY NAMES: FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

DESCRIPTORS: TELEPHONES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS; AUCTIONS

PERSONAL NAMES: RITTER, SCOTT

**8/5/22 (Item 2 from file: 475)**

DIALOG(R)File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs

(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

07906648 NYT Sequence Number: 000000960710

**TUESDAY'S MARKETS: BONDS RISE AFTER AUCTION AND STOCKS GAIN 31 POINTS**

KANSAS, DAVE

Wall Street Journal, Col. 5, Pg. 1, Sec. C

Wednesday July 10 1996

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: WSJ LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Abstract

ABSTRACT:

Bond prices gain amid signs of weak retail sales; stock traders push prices broadly but modestly higher; Dow Jones Industrial Average gains 31.03 to 5581.86 (M)

DESCRIPTORS: STOCKS AND BONDS; DOW JONES STOCK AVERAGE

PERSONAL NAMES: KANSAS, DAVE

**8/5/23 (Item 3 from file: 475)**

DIALOG(R)File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs  
(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

06757493

**FCC REJECTS 13 REQUESTS FOR DEADLINE EXTENSION**

Wall Street Journal, Col. 2, Pg. 5, Sec. B

Monday October 10 1994

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: WSJ LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Abstract

**ABSTRACT:**

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rejects requests by 13 high **bidders** to extend August 8 deadline to make required downpayments for interactive-television licenses; may re- **auction** licenses **awarded** to default **bidders** (S)

DESCRIPTORS: LICENSES; TELEVISION; INTERACTIVE (TWO-WAY) TELEVISION;  
FINANCES; SCHEDULES AND TIMETABLES

**8/5/24 (Item 4 from file: 475)**

DIALOG(R)File 475:Wall Street Journal Abs  
(c) 2004 The New York Times. All rts. reserv.

06268357

**CHRISTIE'S WOOS A NEW AUCTION CLIENTELE : JUNE BRIDES**

Wall Street Journal, Col. 3, Pg. 1, Sec. C

Thursday June 11 1992

DOCUMENT TYPE: Newspaper JOURNAL CODE: WSJ LANGUAGE: English

RECORD TYPE: Abstract

**ABSTRACT:**

Christie's International PLC is holding its first-ever sale of 'Engagement, Wedding Gifts and Furniture for the New Home'; auction firm is drumming up business with such gimmicks as interior decorating tips, models in wedding gowns and advice for prospective buyers from marriage counselor; huge sale is aimed at brides, grooms and wedding guests looking for that perfect **gift** and features 530 items; bridal **auction** is being relegated to Christie's East, bargain-basement arm of company; most items are expected to fetch few hundred dollars; photos (M)

SPECIAL FEATURES: Photo

COMPANY NAMES: CHRISTIE'S INTERNATIONAL PLC

DESCRIPTORS: WEDDINGS AND ENGAGEMENTS; AUCTIONS

**8/5/25 (Item 1 from file: 139)**

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit  
(c) 2004 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

718821

**TITLE: Strategic Trading in a Two-Sided Foreign Exchange Auction**

AUTHOR(S): Goldberg, Linda; Tenorio, Rafael

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: Unlisted; Unlisted

PUBLICATION INFORMATION: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER

Working Papers: 5187

PUBLICATION DATE: 1995

AVAILABILTY: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w5187.pdf>>URL</a>

DOCUMENT TYPE: Working Paper

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: The market microstructure chosen for foreign exchange markets can influence trading volumes and equilibrium exchange rates. With emerging markets and developing countries increasingly utilizing two-sided auctions, we show that the choice of the discrete 't\*btonnement' auction creates incentives for strategic behavior among market participants. We provide theoretical predictions on strategic under-revelation of demand or supply positions that are supported empirically using detailed data from a rare example of a t\*btonnement market, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange. Our results also are consistent with findings from experimental work on auctions: new entrants altered strategic behavior mainly on the market's demand side, without comparable implications for the supply side. We also show that bids and offers were influenced by fundamentals and specific policy measures.

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COMPANY NAMES (DIALOG GENERATED): Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange

8/5/26 (Item 2 from file: 139)

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

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484238

**TITLE: The Symmetric Multiple Prize All-Pay Auction with Complete Information**

AUTHOR(S): Barut, Yasar; Kovenock, Dan

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: Rice U; Purdue U

JOURNAL NAME: European Journal of Political Economy,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 14 4,

PAGES: 627-44

PUBLICATION DATE: November 1998

AVAILABILITY: <A

href="http://www.elsevier.com/inca/publications/store/5/0/5/5/4/4/index.htm">Publisher's URL</A>

ISSN: 0176-2680

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: This paper extends the analysis of the n- player all-pay auction with complete information to cover the case of m is less than or equal to n prizes, valued in weakly decreasing order, but symmetrically across players. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium distributions for this class of auctions and provide an exact expression for the expected revenue generated.

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Auctions (D440); Noncooperative Games (C720); Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (D720)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of Auction Markets (0227); Social Choice Theory (0251); Social Choice Studies: Voting, Committees, etc. (0252); Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (0262)

8/5/27 (Item 3 from file: 139)

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

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483372

**TITLE: Home-Grown Values and Incentive Compatible Auction Design**

AUTHOR(S): Rutstrom, E. Elisabet  
AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U SC  
JOURNAL NAME: International Journal of Game Theory,  
JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 27 3,  
PAGES: 427-41  
PUBLICATION DATE: October 1998  
AVAILABILITY: <A HREF="http://www.tau.ac.il/ijgt/">Publisher's URL</A>  
ISSN: 0020-7276  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article  
ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract  
ABSTRACT: The behavioral properties of several auctions designed to elicit individual valuations for an object are studied using controlled laboratory experiments. Our experiments lead us to conclude that there are some behavioral differences between alternative incentive-compatible institutions for eliciting home-grown values, contrary to the theoretical expectation that these institutions are isomorphic. These results are consistent with earlier experimental results using induced values. The most important finding is that English auctions appear to elicit lower bids than Vickrey auctions, after controlling for observable socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, English auction bids also exhibit significantly less residual variance and may be sensitive to the number of rival **bidders**. It appears that the real-time learning allowed in the English auction significantly affects subject behavior. We also find that values elicited with the Becker, DeGroot and Marshak institution differ from those in both English and Vickrey auctions.  
DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Auctions (D440)  
DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of Auction Markets (0227)

8/5/28 (Item 4 from file: 139)

DIALOG(R) File 139:EconLit

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401980

**TITLE: Procurement Auctions with Entry of Bidders**

AUTHOR(S): Kjerstad, Egil; Vagstad, Steiner

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: Foundation for Research in Econ and Business Administration; Norwegian Research Center in Organization and Management

PUBLICATION INFORMATION: Universitat Bonn Sonderforschungsbereich, Discussion Paper: A/481 PAGES: 32

PUBLICATION DATE: April 1995

AVAILABILITY: Copies available from: Sonderforschungsbereich 303 an der Universitat Bonn, Lennestrasse 37, D53113, Bonn 1, Germany

PRICE: no charge

DOCUMENT TYPE: Working Paper

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: Laffont and Tirole (1987) study a procurement auction with a fixed number of **bidders**. They trade off cost efficiency against information rent left with the firms, and prescribe a mechanism involving cost distortions instead of a plain auction. In contrast, we study a situation in which potential suppliers must sink an entry investment before they can participate in the auction. Then, decreasing the firms' rent also weakens their incentive to enter. We show that i) if the auction is designed after the firms have invested, there is a tendency toward underinvestment; ii) the possibility of entry reduces the benefits of **incentive** contracts; and iii) whenever **auctioning incentive** contracts reduces entry compared to a plain **auction**, the procurer would benefit if **incentive** contracts could be prohibited.

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DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Auctions (D440); Asymmetric and Private Information (D820); Economics of Regulation (L510)  
DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of Auction Markets (0227); Theory of Uncertainty and Information (0261); Economics of Regulation (6190)

**8/5/29 (Item 5 from file: 139)**

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

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389778

**TITLE: Tenders for European Cereal Export Refunds: A Structural Approach**

AUTHOR(S): Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Le Roux, Yves

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: THEMA, U Paris X; INRA-ESR-PAM, Rennes

JOURNAL NAME: European Review of Agricultural Economics,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 23 1,

PAGES: 5-26

PUBLICATION DATE: 1996

ISSN: 0165-1587

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: A large part of the EU's export refunds are **awarded** through tender procedures. We apply **auction** theory to model the **traders** 'behaviour for weekly tenders of soft wheat intervention stocks. Specification and estimation of the optimal bidding strategy are developed under two opposing assumptions about the **traders** ' valuation of grain, each corresponding to a particular functioning of international soft wheat and related markets. This structural approach allows us to conclude that the **traders** ' market power is relatively weak.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION DESCRIPTOR(S): EEC

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Agriculture in International Trade (Q170); Agricultural Finance (Q140)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives (7150); Trade Relations (4210); Agricultural Finance (7140)

COMPANY NAMES (DIALOG GENERATED): EU

**8/5/30 (Item 6 from file: 139)**

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

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347510

**TITLE: EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation**

AUTHOR(S): Cason, Timothy N.; Plott, Charles R.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U Southern CA; CA Institute of Technology

PUBLICATION INFORMATION: Caltech Social Science Working Paper: 863 PAGES: 29

PUBLICATION DATE: November 1993

AVAILABILITY: Copies available from: Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125

PRICE: no charge

DOCUMENT TYPE: Working Paper

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: The EPA has designed a new call auction institution for trading allowances to emit sulfur dioxide. This paper reports twelve laboratory



File 348:EUROPEAN PATENTS 1978-2004/May W01  
(c) 2004 European Patent Office  
File 349:PCT FULLTEXT 1979-2002/UB=20040429,UT=20040422  
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| Set | Items | Description  |
|-----|-------|--|
| S1  | 154   | (AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR ENGLISH-<br>)()AUCTION?)(5N)(REWARD? OR INCENTIVE? OR AWARD? OR PREMIUM? -<br>OR GIFT? OR CARROT? OR PRIZE? OR POINTS OR BONUS? OR PROMOTIO-<br>N?) |
| S2  | 3239  | (QUALIF? OR APPROV? OR ELIGIB?)(5N)(BIDDER? OR PERSON OR P-<br>ERSONS OR PLAYER OR PLAYERS OR CUSTOMER? OR CLIENT? OR TRADER<br>OR TRADERS OR PARTICIPANT OR PARTICIPANTS) NOT WINNER?                 |
| S3  | 739   | AU=(WALKER, J? OR WALKER J? OR VAN()LUCHENE, A? OR VAN()LU-<br>CHENE A? OR TEDESCO, D? OR TEDESCO D?)  |
| S4  | 3     | S1(S)S2  |
| S5  | 0     | S3(S)(S1 OR S2)  |
| S6  | 0     | S3(S)(AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR EN-<br>GLISH)()AUCTION?)   |
| S7  | 0     | S3(S)AUCTION?  |

4/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00849780 \*\*Image available\*\*

**REAL-TIME INTERACTIVE WAGERING ON EVENT OUTCOMES**  
**PARIS INTERACTIFS EN TEMPS REEL SUR DES RESULTATS D'EVENEMENTS**

Patent Applicant/Assignee:

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Legal Representative:

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Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200183058 A2 20011108 (WO 0183058)

Application: WO 2001US13683 20010430 (PCT/WO US0113683)

Priority Application: US 2000201038 20000501

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU

CZ DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR

KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE

SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE TR

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 8668

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description

Detailed Description

... dealer risk.

The brokerage environment of the present  
invention preferably includes the following features: a  
**participant qualification** state, an instrument creation  
state, a bid/offer state, a "when" state, a qualified THAT PROVIDE  
**INCENTIVES AND LINKED AUCTIONS** ," filed on  
June 14, 2000, now U.S. Patent No. , which is  
hereby incorporated by...

4/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00799878 \*\*Image available\*\*

**AUTOMATIC BID PROCESSING METHOD USING COMPUTER NETWORK SYSTEM**  
**TECHNIQUE DE TRAITEMENT AUTOMATIQUE DE SOUMISSION UTILISANT UN RESEAU**  
**INFORMATIQUE**

Patent Applicant/Assignee:

INTERNET AUCTION CO LTD, 6F. Miraewasaram Internet Tower, 942-1

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(Nationality), (For all designated states except: US)

Patent Applicant/Inventor:

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138-200, KR, KR (Residence), KR (Nationality), (Designated only for:  
US)

Legal Representative:

LEE Young-Pil (agent), The Cheonghwg Building, 1571-18 Seocho-dong,  
Seocho-gu, Seoul 137-874, KR,

Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200133449 A1 20010510 (WO 0133449),

Application: WO 2000KR1221 20001027 (PCT/WO KR0001221)

Priority Application: KR 9947796 19991030

Designated States: AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA CH CN CR CU CZ

DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KZ LC

LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI

SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

(EP) AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE

(OA) BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

(AP) GH GM KE LS MW MZ SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW

(EA) AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM

Publication Language: English

Filing Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 3676

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description

Claims

Detailed Description

... at the same

time, the person who intends to purchase the greatest quantity of the  
**auctioned** item is **awarded** the purchase, and when this still does not  
narrow 2o down the **qualifications** to one **person** , the **person** whose  
bid is accepted is determined by holding a lottery.

It is preferable that a...In such a case, two person who intends  
to purchase the greatest quantity of the **auctioned** item is **awarded**  
the  
purchase, and when this still does not narrow down the **qualifications**  
to  
one **person** , a lottery must be held.

Next, when the last bid Pi is lower than the...

Claim

... at the same time, the person who intends to  
purchase the greatest quantity of the **auctioned** item is **awarded** the  
purchase, and when this still does not narrow down the **qualifications**  
to one  
**person** , the **person** whose bid is accepted is determined by holding a  
lottery.

4 The automatic bid processing...

4/3,K/3 (Item 3 from file: 349)  
DIALOG(R)File 349:PCT FULLTEXT  
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00577735 \*\*Image available\*\*

**SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ENCOURAGING COMPETITIVE PARTICIPATION IN AN AUCTION  
SYSTEME ET PROCEDE POUR ENCOURAGER LA PARTICIPATION CONCURRENTIELLE A UNE  
VENTE AUX ENCHERES**

Patent Applicant/Assignee:

WALKER DIGITAL LLC,  
WALKER Jay S,  
VAN LUCHENE Andrew S,  
TEDESCO Daniel E,

Inventor(s):

WALKER Jay S,  
VAN LUCHENE Andrew S,  
TEDESCO Daniel E,

Patent and Priority Information (Country, Number, Date):

Patent: WO 200041108 A1 20000713 (WO 0041108)

Application: WO 99US23901 19991014 (PCT/WO US9923901)

Priority Application: US 98223901 19981231

Designated States: AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN CU CZ DE DK EE

ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT

LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT

UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW GH GM KE LS MW SD SL SZ TZ UG ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ

MD RU TJ TM AT BE CH CY DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU MC NL PT SE BF BJ

CF CG CI CM GA GN GW ML MR NE SN TD TG

Publication Language: English

Fulltext Word Count: 11034

Fulltext Availability:

Detailed Description

Claims

Detailed Description

... during an auction session; receiving a bid for the product from a bidder during the **auction** session; determining, based on a **reward** rule, whether the **bidder** is **qualified** to receive a reward; and if the **bidder** is **qualified**, transmitting, to the **bidder**, an indication that the **bidder** is **qualified** to receive the reward.

According to a second aspect of the present invention, a system... appropriate fields of current auction database 214. Then, at step 912, processor 200 retrieves the **reward** rules corresponding to the current **auction** as stored in **reward** rules field 706 of reward rules database 220. At step 914, processor 200 compares the received bid to the reward rules to determine if the **bidder** is **qualified** to receive a reward based on her bid. If so, process 900 continues to step...

Claim

... during an auction session;  
receive a bid for the product from a bidder during the **auction** session;  
determine, based on a **reward** rule, whether the **bidder** is **qualified** to  
receive a reward, and if the **bidder** is **qualified** :  
transmit, to the **bidder**, an indication that the **bidder** is **qualified** to  
receive the reward.

63 A computer readable medium encoded with processing instructions for

markets that investigate **trader** behavior in this new institution and evaluate its performance relative to the more commonly observed uniform price call market. We find that the uniform price call market (1) is more efficient, (2) induces more truthful revelation of underlying values and costs, (3) provides more accurate price information, and (4) is more responsive to and recovers more quickly from changes in underlying market conditions. All of these differences result from the intense strategic manipulation **incentives** of the EPA **auction**. Under the EPA auction rules both buyers and sellers misrepresent their true value of the emission permits, which biases market-clearing prices downwards. This suggests that the EPA auction will provide poor price signals to the evolving allowance market.

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DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management: Water; Air (Q250); Renewable Resources and Conservation; Environmental Management: Government Policy (Q280)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Conservation and Pollution (7220); Natural Resources--General (7210)

8/5/31 (Item 7 from file: 139)

DIALOG(R) File 139:EconLit

(c) 2004 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

329525

**TITLE: Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry**

AUTHOR(S): Levin, Dan; Smith, James L.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U Houston; U Houston

JOURNAL NAME: American Economic Review,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 84 3,

PAGES: 585-99

PUBLICATION DATE: June 1994

ISSN: 0002-8282

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: The authors model entry **incentives** in **auctions** with risk-neutral **bidders** and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic. The presence of too many potential **bidders** raises coordination costs that detract from welfare. The authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness (i.e., the relative abundance of buyers). Their analysis extends well-known revenue-equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies (e.g., reservation prices) in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry.

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Auctions (D440)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of Auction Markets (0227)

8/5/32 (Item 8 from file: 139)

DIALOG(R) File 139:EconLit

(c) 2004 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

326639

**TITLE: Second Price Auctions without Expected Utility**

AUTHOR(S): Neilson, William S.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: TX A&M U

JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Economic Theory,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 62 1,  
PAGES: 136-51  
PUBLICATION DATE: February 1994  
ISSN: 0022-0531

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: Expected utility maximizers bid according to dominant strategies in second price **auctions** for risky **prizes**, bids are independent of the number of other **bidders** or the reserve price, the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of **bidders**, and ascending bid and second price auctions generate the same expected revenue. If expected utility fails, none of these results remain true and symmetric equilibria may not be unique. If fanning in and betweenness hold, uniqueness is restored, bids fall when the number of **bidders** or the reserve price increases and second price auctions generate higher bids than ascending bid auctions. (c) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Auctions (D440); Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty (D810)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Microeconomics--Theory of Auction Markets (0227); Organization and Decision Theory (5110); Microeconomics--Agent Theory (0228)

COMPANY NAMES (DIALOG GENERATED): Academic Press Inc

**8/5/33 (Item 9 from file: 139)**

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

(c) 2004 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

299469

**TITLE: Managerial Incentives and Corporate Control Auctions**

AUTHOR(S): Banerjee, Ajeyo; Owers, James E.

AUTHOR(S) AFFILIATION: U CO, Denver; GA State U and U MA

JOURNAL NAME: Managerial and Decision Economics,

JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE: 14 4,

PAGES: 295-309

PUBLICATION DATE: July-Aug 1993

ISSN: 0143-6570

DOCUMENT TYPE: Journal Article

ABSTRACT INDICATOR: Abstract

ABSTRACT: An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as "delayed bid" white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The "immediate bid" white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the "immediate bid" white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the "immediate bid" white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to "delayed bid" white knights and hostile **bidders**.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION DESCRIPTOR(S): U.S.

DESCRIPTOR(S) (1991 to Present): Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests (G340); Personnel Management; executive compensation (M120)

DESCRIPTOR(S) (Pre-1991): Market Structure: Industrial Organization and Corporate Strategy (6110); Business Finance (5210); Business Administration (5131)

**8/5/34 (Item 10 from file: 139)**

DIALOG(R)File 139:EconLit

(c) 2004 American Economic Association. All rts. reserv.

200074

**TITLE:** The Formation of Price Forecasts in Experimental Markets

**AUTHOR(S):** Williams, Arlington W.

**JOURNAL NAME:** Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,

**JOURNAL VOLUME & ISSUE:** 19 1,

**PAGES:** 1-18

**PUBLICATION DATE:** February 1987

**ISSN:** 0022-2879

**DOCUMENT TYPE:** Journal Article

**ABSTRACT INDICATOR:** Abstract

**ABSTRACT:** This study utilizes laboratory experimental methods to evaluate the empirical validity of: (1) "Muthian" rational expectations assumptions, (2) an adaptive expectations model, and (3) an extrapolative expectations model. Over 5 00 price forecasts from 146 **participants** in twelve experimental double- **auction** markets with a cash **reward** structure are analyzed. The forecasting objective is the mean price over a sequence of trading periods governed by stationary market parameters. The price forecasts are found to be inconsistent with strict Muthian rational expectations and the extrapolative model is not supported by the data. However, the forecasts generally support the adaptive expectations model.

**DESCRIPTOR(S)** (Pre-1991): Macroeconomic Theory General (0230);  
Experimental Economic Methods (2150)

?

File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R) 1990-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB 1976-2004/May 10  
     (c)2004 The Gale Group  
 File 160:Gale Group PROMT(R) 1972-1989  
     (c) 1999 The Gale Group  
 File 275:Gale Group Computer DB(TM) 1983-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 621:Gale Group New Prod.Annou.(R) 1985-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 636:Gale Group Newsletter DB(TM) 1987-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 9:Business & Industry(R) Jul/1994-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 15:ABI/Inform(R) 1971-2004/May 08  
     (c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning  
 File 20:Dialog Global Reporter 1997-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 The Dialog Corp.  
 File 95:TEME-Technology & Management 1989-2004/Apr W3  
     (c) 2004 FIZ TECHNIK  
 File 476:Financial Times Fulltext 1982-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 Financial Times Ltd  
 File 610:Business Wire 1999-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 Business Wire.  
 File 613:PR Newswire 1999-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 PR Newswire Association Inc  
 File 624:McGraw-Hill Publications 1985-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 McGraw-Hill Co. Inc  
 File 634:San Jose Mercury Jun 1985-2004/May 08  
     (c) 2004 San Jose Mercury News  
 File 810:Business Wire 1986-1999/Feb 28  
     (c) 1999 Business Wire  
 File 813:PR Newswire 1987-1999/Apr 30  
     (c) 1999 PR Newswire Association Inc  
 File 635:Business Dateline(R) 1985-2004/May 08  
     (c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning  
 File 570:Gale Group MARS(R) 1984-2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 The Gale Group  
 File 477:Irish Times 1999-2004/May 08  
     (c) 2004 Irish Times  
 File 710:Times/Sun.Times(London) Jun 1988-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 Times Newspapers  
 File 711:Independent(London) Sep 1988-2004/May 08  
     (c) 2004 Newspaper Publ. PLC  
 File 756:Daily/Sunday Telegraph 2000-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 Telegraph Group  
 File 757:Mirror Publications/Independent Newspapers 2000-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004  
 File 387:The Denver Post 1994-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 Denver Post  
 File 471:New York Times Fulltext 90-Day 2004/May 10  
     (c) 2004 The New York Times  
 File 492:Arizona Repub/Phoenix Gaz 19862002/Jan 06  
     (c) 2002 Phoenix Newspapers  
 File 494:St LouisPost-Dispatch 1988-2004/May 09  
     (c) 2004 St Louis Post-Dispatch  
 File 498:Detroit Free Press 1987-2004/Apr 27  
     (c) 2004 Detroit Free Press Inc.  
 File 631:Boston Globe 1980-2004/May 07  
     (c) 2004 Boston Globe  
 File 633:Phil.Inquirer 1983-2004/May 06



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File 638:Newsday/New York Newsday 1987-2004/May 08  
(c) 2004 Newsday Inc.  
File 640:San Francisco Chronicle 1988-2004/May 09  
(c) 2004 Chronicle Publ. Co.  
File 641:Rocky Mountain News Jun 1989-2004/May 06  
(c) 2004 Scripps Howard News  
File 702:Miami Herald 1983-2004/May 07  
(c) 2004 The Miami Herald Publishing Co.  
File 703:USA Today 1989-2004/May 08  
(c) 2004 USA Today  
File 704:(Portland)The Oregonian 1989-2004/May 09  
(c) 2004 The Oregonian  
File 713:Atlanta J/Const. 1989-2004/May 06  
(c) 2004 Atlanta Newspapers  
File 714:(Baltimore) The Sun 1990-2004/May 10  
(c) 2004 Baltimore Sun  
File 715:Christian Sci.Mon. 1989-2004/May 10  
(c) 2004 Christian Science Monitor  
File 725:(Cleveland)Plain Dealer Aug 1991-2004/May 09  
(c) 2004 The Plain Dealer  
File 735:St. Petersburg Times 1989- 2004/May 09  
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File 625:American Banker Publications 1981-2004/May 10  
(c) 2004 American Banker  
File 268:Banking Info Source 1981-2004/Apr W3  
(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning  
File 626:Bond Buyer Full Text 1981-2004/May 10  
(c) 2004 Bond Buyer  
File 267:Finance & Banking Newsletters 2004/May 10  
(c) 2004 The Dialog Corp.

? ds

| Set | Items  | Description  |
|-----|--------|--|
| S1  | 19934  | (AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUCTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR ENGLISH-<br>)()AUCTION?) (5N) (REWARD? OR INCENTIVE? OR AWARD? OR PREMIUM? -<br>OR GIFT? OR CARROT? OR PRIZE? OR POINTS OR BONUS? OR PROMOTIO-<br>N?) |
| S2  | 236192 | (QUALIF? OR APPROV? OR ELIGIB?) (5N) (BIDDER? OR PERSON OR P-<br>ERSONS OR PLAYER OR PLAYERS OR CUSTOMER? OR CLIENT? OR TRADER<br>OR TRADERS OR PARTICIPANT OR PARTICIPANTS) NOT WINNER?                 |
| S3  | 1583   | AU=(WALKER, J? OR WALKER J? OR VAN()) LUCHENE, A? OR VAN() LU-<br>CHENE A? OR TEDESCO, D? OR TEDESCO D?)   |
| S4  | 26     | S1(S)S2  |
| S5  | 13     | S4 NOT PY>1998   |
| S6  | 11     | RD (unique items)  |
| S7  | 0      | S3(S) (S1 OR S2)   |
| ?   |        |  |

6/3,K/1 (Item 1 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

04797011 Supplier Number: 47058742 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Adbot, Inc., announces debut of Internet advertising network.**  
Business Wire, p01231297  
Jan 23, 1997  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Newswire; Trade  
Word Count: 615

... at <http://www.adbot.com>.  
Auction bids will be placed in "real time" by pre- **qualified participants** from across the nation who will have a "virtual presence" at the auction or who...

...out the bids of participants according to rules established by the brokerage firm. An Adbot **auctioneer** will **award** bundles of impressions, called "blocks," to winning bidders.

Following the auction, Adbot will oversee the...

6/3,K/2 (Item 2 from file: 16)  
DIALOG(R)File 16:Gale Group PROMT(R)  
(c) 2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

03064444 Supplier Number: 44171041 (USE FORMAT 7 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Open-outcry hotel auction to debut in Beverly Hills**  
Hotel & Motel Management, p14  
Oct 18, 1993  
Language: English Record Type: Fulltext  
Document Type: Magazine/Journal; Tabloid; Trade  
Word Count: 563

... next six weeks we have 21 people working full-time with sellers to make this **auction** a success. Our **promotions** will be tailored to meet the sellers' needs. We're going all-out to get **qualified bidders** in the auction room on the day of the auction.' H&MM

6/3,K/3 (Item 1 from file: 148)  
DIALOG(R)File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB  
(c)2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

06812573 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 14280347 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULL TEXT)  
**Open-outcry hotel auction to debut in Beverly Hills.**  
Troy, Timothy N.  
Hotel & Motel Management, v208, n18, p14(2)  
Oct 18, 1993  
ISSN: 0018-6082 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT; ABSTRACT  
WORD COUNT: 593 LINE COUNT: 00045

... will be tailored to meet the sellers' needs. We're going all-out to get **qualified bidders** in the auction room on the day of the auction."

6/3,K/4 (Item 2 from file: 148)  
DIALOG(R)File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB  
(c)2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

05845172 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 12092294 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULL TEXT)  
**Statements to the Congress. (E. Gerald Corrigan testimony concerning  
government securities market reform) (Transcript)**  
Federal Reserve Bulletin, v78, n4, p258(5)  
April, 1992  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Transcript ISSN: 0014-9209 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH  
RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT; ABSTRACT  
WORD COUNT: 2290 LINE COUNT: 00183

... as would acceptable methods for making payment for securities and  
for receiving delivery of securities **awarded** in the **auctions** . Because  
payment and delivery must be made in electronic form, nonbanks would have  
to have...

**6/3,K/5 (Item 3 from file: 148)**  
DIALOG(R)File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB  
(c)2004 The Gale Group. All rts. reserv.

05590096 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 12108156 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULL TEXT)  
**Changes in the government securities market. (E. Gerald Corrigan statement  
to the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee and the  
Domestic Monetary Policy subcommittee)(includes appendix concerning the  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York's administration of securities dealers)  
(Transcript)**  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, v16, n4, p6(6)  
Winter, 1991  
DOCUMENT TYPE: Transcript ISSN: 0147-6580 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH  
RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT; ABSTRACT  
WORD COUNT: 2307 LINE COUNT: 00183

... as would acceptable methods for making payment for securities and  
for receiving delivery of securities **awarded** in the **auctions** . Since

payment and delivery must be made in electronic form, nonbanks would have to have...

**6/3,K/6 (Item 4 from file: 148)**

DIALOG(R)File 148:Gale Group Trade & Industry DB  
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05558151 SUPPLIER NUMBER: 11591043 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULL TEXT)  
**Statements to the Congress. (statement by E. Gerald Corrigan to the U.S. Senate) (Transcript)**

Federal Reserve Bulletin, v77, n11, p896(7)

Nov, 1991

DOCUMENT TYPE: Transcript ISSN: 0014-9209 LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

RECORD TYPE: FULLTEXT

WORD COUNT: 4432 LINE COUNT: 00336

... in government securities. Having said that, it is also true that in recent years the **auction awards** have tended to become more concentrated, especially if one takes account of the large institutional...

**6/3,K/7 (Item 1 from file: 15)**

DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

00725963 93-75184

**Statement to the Congress: E. Gerald Corrigan**

Corrigan, E. Gerald

Federal Reserve Bulletin v78n4 PP: 258-262 Apr 1992

ISSN: 0014-9209 JRNL CODE: FRS

WORD COUNT: 2177

...TEXT: security and encryption devices that are currently used for Fedwire operations.

Second, for each such "**eligible**" **bidder**, certain data--including any affiliations with other "**eligible**" **bidders**--would have to be housed in our database, as would acceptable methods for making payment for securities and for receiving delivery of securities **awarded** in the **auctions**. Because payment and delivery must be made in electronic form, nonbanks would have to have...

**6/3,K/8 (Item 2 from file: 15)**

DIALOG(R)File 15:ABI/Inform(R)  
(c) 2004 ProQuest Info&Learning. All rts. reserv.

00717374 93-66595

**Congress moves toward auctions**

Mason, Charles F

Telephony v224n22 PP: 1 May 31, 1993

ISSN: 0040-2656 JRNL CODE: TPH

WORD COUNT: 298

...TEXT: for a range of new wireless offerings, including personal communication services (PCS)--to the highest **bidder**.

The committee voted to **approve** the reallocation of government-held spectrum, along with a proposal to allow that spectrum to be **awarded**

through an **auctioning** process. **Auctions** , long supported by many Republicans on Capitol Hill, picked up major support earlier this year...

**6/3,K/9** (Item 1 from file: 624)  
DIALOG(R)File 624:McGraw-Hill Publications  
(c) 2004 McGraw-Hill Co. Inc. All rts. reserv.

0200862

**DUNCAN, SOTHEBY'S SPONSORING BUSINESS JET AND TURBOPROP AUCTION IN JUNE**  
The Weekly of Business Aviation March 5, 1990; Pg 75; Vol. 50, No. 10  
Journal Code: BA ISSN: 0509-9528  
Word Count: 495 \*Full text available in Formats 5, 7 and 9\*

TEXT:

... out. In addition to checking out the aircraft being sold, Duncan said Sotheby's will **qualify bidders** prior to the auction to make sure they have the resources necessary to bid. Sellers...

... jets and heavy turboprops will pay a four percent commission. Those purchasing aircraft at the **auction** will pay a "buyer's **premium** " based on the same commission structure applicable to sellers. Although Duncan-Sotheby will impose a...

**6/3,K/10** (Item 1 from file: 387)  
DIALOG(R)File 387:The Denver Post  
(c) 2004 Denver Post. All rts. reserv.

00698111 (USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)  
**Silver Bell Ball plans to raise \$100,000**  
Joanne Davidson  
Denver Post, SUN1 ED, P I-14  
Sunday, November 30, 1997  
DOCUMENT TYPE: NEWSPAPER; COLUMN LANGUAGE: ENGLISH RECORD TYPE:  
FULLTEXT SECTION HEADING: LIVELY ARTS  
Word Count: 1,177

(USE FORMAT 7 OR 9 FOR FULLTEXT)

...a.m. at Columbine Country Club. Tickets are \$35 and include a champagne lunch, silent **auction** and **prizes** . Call Karen Trujillo, 756-4062. Wednesday: QuaLifeline, a guild supporting QuaLife Wellness Community, meets at...

...nearly new decorations and goodies wrapped for the freezer. The latter will be served to **QuaLife clients** during the holidays.

Wednesday: The Denver Public Library Friends Foundation salutes the 10th Mountain Division...

**6/3,K/11** (Item 1 from file: 714)  
DIALOG(R)File 714:(Baltimore) The Sun  
(c) 2004 Baltimore Sun. All rts. reserv.

07740179

**AUCTIONS BID FOR MORE HOME SALES**  
BALTIMORE MORNING SUN (BS) - Sunday August 28, 1994

By: Lorraine Mirabella Sun Staff Writer  
Edition: Final Section: Business Page: 1K  
Word Count: 919

...works theoretically, anyway. Auctioneers spend about six weeks promoting the event, showing the home and **qualifying bidders** when possible. After opening bidding at a pre-set minimum price, the **auction** or real estate company **awards** the home to the highest bidder. The property is almost guaranteed to sell, Mr. Ottenstein...  
?

File 344:Chinese Patents Abs Aug 1985-2004/Mar  
(c) 2004 European Patent Office  
File 347:JAPIO Nov 1976-2003/Dec(Updated 040402)  
(c) 2004 JPO & JAPIO  
File 350:Derwent WPIX 1963-2004/UD,UM &UP=200428  
(c) 2004 Thomson Derwent

? ds

| Set | Items | Description   |
|-----|-------|---|
| S1  | 54    | (AUCTION? OR DUTCHAUTION? OR (DUTCH OR REVERSE OR ENGLISH-<br>) (AUCTION?) (5N) (REWARD? OR INCENTIVE? OR AWARD? OR PREMIUM? -<br>OR GIFT? OR CARROT? OR PRIZE? OR POINTS OR BONUS? OR PROMOTIO-<br>N?) |
| S2  | 1080  | (QUALIF? OR APPROV? OR ELIGIB?) (5N) (BIDDER? OR PERSON OR P-<br>ERSONS OR PLAYER OR PLAYERS OR CUSTOMER? OR CLIENT? OR TRADER<br>OR TRADERS OR PARTICIPANT OR PARTICIPANTS) NOT WINNER?                |
| S3  | 1148  | AU=(WALKER, J? OR WALKER J? OR VAN()) LUCHENE, A? OR VAN() LU-<br>CHENE A? OR TEDESCO, D? OR TEDESCO D?)  |
| S4  | 2     | S1 AND S2   |
| S5  | 1     | S3 AND S1   |

4/5/1 (Item 1 from file: 350)  
DIALOG(R) File 350:Derwent WPIX  
(c) 2004 Thomson Derwent. All rts. reserv.

014595149 \*\*Image available\*\*  
WPI Acc No: 2002-415853/200244  
XRPX Acc No: N02-327178

Online auction conducting method for electronic commerce environment,  
involves receiving bidders response proposals at specific web site, based  
on auctioneer's proposal

Patent Assignee: BALLMANN F X (BALL-I); GOLDEN M K. (GOLD-I); HONG P S  
(HONG-I); VERSURA INC (VERS-N); HONG P (HONG-I)

Inventor: BALLMANN F X; GOLDEN M K; HONG P; HONG P S

Number of Countries: 095 Number of Patents: 003

Patent Family:

| Patent No      | Kind | Date     | Applicat No    | Kind | Date     | Week     |
|----------------|------|----------|----------------|------|----------|----------|
| WO 200221385   | A1   | 20020314 | WO 2001US27520 | A    | 20010906 | 200244 B |
| US 20020038285 | A1   | 20020328 | US 2000231241  | A    | 20000908 | 200244   |
|                |      |          | US 2001946559  | A    | 20010906 |          |
| AU 200188756   | A    | 20020322 | AU 200188756   | A    | 20010906 | 200251   |

Priority Applications (No Type Date): US 2000231241 P 20000908; US  
2001946559 A 20010906

Patent Details:

| Patent No | Kind | Lan | Pg | Main IPC | Filing Notes |
|-----------|------|-----|----|----------|--------------|
|-----------|------|-----|----|----------|--------------|

|              |    |   |    |             |  |
|--------------|----|---|----|-------------|--|
| WO 200221385 | A1 | E | 67 | G06F-017/60 |  |
|--------------|----|---|----|-------------|--|

Designated States (National): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY BZ CA  
CH CN CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP  
KE KG KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NO NZ PH PL  
PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK SL TJ TM TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

Designated States (Regional): AT BE CH CY DE DK EA ES FI FR GB GH GM GR  
IE IT KE LS LU MC MW MZ NL OA PT SD SE SL SZ TR TZ UG ZW

|                |    |  |             |                         |               |
|----------------|----|--|-------------|-------------------------|---------------|
| US 20020038285 | A1 |  | G06F-017/60 | Provisional application | US 2000231241 |
|----------------|----|--|-------------|-------------------------|---------------|

|              |   |  |             |                 |              |
|--------------|---|--|-------------|-----------------|--------------|
| AU 200188756 | A |  | G06F-017/60 | Based on patent | WO 200221385 |
|--------------|---|--|-------------|-----------------|--------------|

Abstract (Basic): WO 200221385 A1

NOVELTY - Bidders response proposals are received at a web site of  
a global computer network, based on the request for proposal posted by  
an auctioneer on the site. The auctioneer is enabled to evaluate the  
response proposals and select **qualifying bidders** for a second  
bidding round. The processes are repeated based on the **auctioneer's**  
choice to continue **auctioning** **award** winning bidders are selected  
and notified.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION - INDEPENDENT CLAIMS are also included for the  
following:

- (a) Online auction conducting system;
- (b) Lenders selection method;
- (c) Loan port-folio and forward purchase commitment auctioning

method

USE - For e-commerce environment in which higher education  
institutions, lenders and loan buyers communicate and auction to  
conduct business such as provision of educational loans etc., and to  
provide services such as debt counseling, exit (loan repayment)  
counseling, repayment planning service, etc.

ADVANTAGE - Creates a dynamic, responsive marketplace that  
facilitates swift, secure and efficient transaction between the auction  
participants by using a multi-round auction method. Provides an  
e-commerce platform for business-to-business marketing of federally  
guaranteed and private education loans at low acquisition cost.

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWING(S) - The figure shows a flowchart explaining



the method of conducting an online auction.  
pp; 67 DwgNo 2/14  
Title Terms: AUCTION; CONDUCTING; METHOD; ELECTRONIC; ENVIRONMENT; RECEIVE;  
RESPOND; SPECIFIC; WEB; SITE; BASED  
Derwent Class: T01  
International Patent Class (Main): G06F-017/60  
International Patent Class (Additional): G06K-005/00  
File Segment: EPI

4/5/2 (Item 2 from file: 350)  
DIALOG(R)File 350:Derwent WPIX  
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013507138 \*\*Image available\*\*  
WPI Acc No: 2000-679082/200066  
XRPX Acc No: N00-502740

**Competitive bidding** rewarding method on-line auction , involves  
qualifying bidder to receive reward , when his bid is greater than  
that of remaining bids

Patent Assignee: WALKER DIGITAL LLC (WALK-N)  
Inventor: TEDESCO D E; VAN LUCHENE A S; WALKER J S  
Number of Countries: 087 Number of Patents: 002  
Patent Family:

| Patent No    | Kind | Date     | Applicat No  | Kind | Date     | Week     |
|--------------|------|----------|--------------|------|----------|----------|
| WO 200041108 | A1   | 20000713 | WO 99US23901 | A    | 19991014 | 200066 B |
| AU 200012044 | A    | 20000724 | AU 200012044 | A    | 19991014 | 200066   |

Priority Applications (No Type Date): US 98223901 A 19981231

Patent Details:

| Patent No | Kind | Lan | Pg | Main IPC | Filing Notes |
|-----------|------|-----|----|----------|--------------|
|-----------|------|-----|----|----------|--------------|

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|--------------|----|---|----|-------------|--|
| WO 200041108 | A1 | E | 46 | G06F-017/60 |  |
|--------------|----|---|----|-------------|--|

Designated States (National): AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN  
CU CZ DE DK EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ  
LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK  
SL TJ TM TR TT UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

Designated States (Regional): AT BE CH CY DE DK EA ES FI FR GB GH GM GR  
IE IT KE LS LU MC MW NL OA PT SD SE SL SZ TZ UG ZW

|              |   |  |  |             |                              |
|--------------|---|--|--|-------------|------------------------------|
| AU 200012044 | A |  |  | G06F-017/60 | Based on patent WO 200041108 |
|--------------|---|--|--|-------------|------------------------------|

Abstract (Basic): WO 200041108 A1

NOVELTY - The product for bidding is identified and the bid for product is received from a bidder, during auction session. When the bid from bidder is greater than that of remaining bids, it is determined whether the **bidder** is **qualified** to receive a reward, based on the reward rule. If the **bidder** is **qualified**, an indication is transmitted to the bidder.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION - The reward includes value of currency, supplement to bit, rebate on the product, amount of frequent flier miles, secondary product, service and warranty for the product, etc. INDEPENDENT CLAIMS are also included for the following:

- (a) method of providing penalty to bidder;
- (b) method of participation in auction session;
- (c) apparatus for rewarding bidder;
- (d) apparatus for providing penalty to bidder;
- (e) program product

USE - For **rewarding** bidder in on line **auction** environment during sale of luxury items, antiques or high ticket items via LAN, WAN, internet, intranet, public telephone exchange system, etc.

ADVANTAGE - Encourages competitive bidding and discourages unreasonable bit submission by providing reward or penalty to bidder.

5/5/1 (Item 1 from file: 350)  
DIALOG(R)File 350:Derwent WPIX  
(c) 2004 Thomson Derwent. All rts. reserv.

013507138 \*\*Image available\*\*  
WPI Acc No: 2000-679082/200066  
XRPX Acc No: N00-502740

**Competitive bidding** rewarding method on-line auction , involves  
qualifying bidder to receive reward , when his bid is greater than that  
of remaining bids

Patent Assignee: WALKER DIGITAL LLC (WALK-N)  
Inventor: **TEDESCO D E** ; VAN LUCHENE A S; **WALKER J S**  
Number of Countries: 087 Number of Patents: 002  
Patent Family:

| Patent No    | Kind | Date     | Applicat No  | Kind | Date     | Week     |
|--------------|------|----------|--------------|------|----------|----------|
| WO 200041108 | A1   | 20000713 | WO 99US23901 | A    | 19991014 | 200066 B |
| AU 200012044 | A    | 20000724 | AU 200012044 | A    | 19991014 | 200066   |

Priority Applications (No Type Date): US 98223901 A 19981231  
Patent Details:

| Patent No    | Kind | Lan | Pg | Main IPC    | Filing Notes |
|--------------|------|-----|----|-------------|--------------|
| WO 200041108 | A1   | E   | 46 | G06F-017/60 |              |

Designated States (National): AE AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BY CA CH CN  
CU CZ DE DK EE ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KP KR KZ  
LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MD MG MK MN MW MX NO NZ PL PT RO RU SD SE SG SI SK  
SL TJ TM TR TT UA UG US UZ VN YU ZA ZW

Designated States (Regional): AT BE CH CY DE DK EA ES FI FR GB GH GM GR  
IE IT KE LS LU MC MW NL OA PT SD SE SL SZ TZ UG ZW

AU 200012044 A G06F-017/60 Based on patent WO 200041108

Abstract (Basic): WO 200041108 A1

NOVELTY - The product for bidding is identified and the bid for product is received from a bidder, during auction session. When the bid from bidder is greater than that of remaining bids, it is determined whether the bidder is qualified to receive a reward, based on the reward rule. If the bidder is qualified, an indication is transmitted to the bidder.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION - The reward includes value of currency, supplement to bit, rebate on the product, amount of frequent flier miles, secondary product, service and warranty for the product, etc. INDEPENDENT CLAIMS are also included for the following:

- (a) method of providing penalty to bidder;
- (b) method of participation in auction session;
- (c) apparatus for rewarding bidder;
- (d) apparatus for providing penalty to bidder;
- (e) program product

USE - For **rewarding** bidder in on line **auction** environment during sale of luxury items, antiques or high ticket items via LAN, WAN, internet, intranet, public telephone exchange system, etc.

ADVANTAGE - Encourages competitive bidding and discourages unreasonable bit submission by providing reward or penalty to bidder.

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWING(S) - The figure shows the flowchart illustrating the steps performed by auction server.

pp; 46 DwgNo 9/10

Title Terms: COMPETE; BID; METHOD; LINE; AUCTION; QUALIFY; RECEIVE; REWARD;  
BID; GREATER; REMAINING; BID

Derwent Class: T01

International Patent Class (Main): G06F-017/60

File Segment: EPI

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